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ARTICLES 
The Commensurability Myth 
in Antitrust 
Rebecca Haw Allensworth* 
Modern antitrust law pursues a seemingly unitary goal: competition. In 
fact, competition—whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes 
associated with competitive markets—is multifaceted. What are offered in 
antitrust cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are typically 
qualitatively different, and trading them off is as much an exercise in judgment 
as mathematics. But despite the inevitability of value judgments in antitrust 
cases, courts have perpetuated a commensurability myth, claiming to evaluate 
“net” competitive effect as if the pros and cons of a restraint of trade are in the 
same unit of measure. The myth is attractive to courts because it appears to 
allow the law to avoid the murky, value-laden compromises struck by other 
areas of regulation. But courts have suppressed important debates about what 
matters most about competition by glossing over the fact that even given a 
narrow mandate—to protect competition—antitrust law must make contested 
value judgments. Debunking the commensurability myth is the first step in 
stimulating scholarly and judicial debates about how to balance antitrust’s 
inherent tradeoffs, such as price effects with qualitative consumer welfare, 
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present with future benefits from competition, and consumer welfare among 
different classes of purchasers. 
This Article explores the commensurability myth, using Sherman Act § 
1 cases to illustrate the incommensurability of most pro- and anticompetitive 
effects claimed in an antitrust suit. It then argues that the myth distorts 
antitrust litigation as courts find ways—such as insurmountable burdens of 
proof—to avoid the appearance of incommensurate balancing. Finally, it 
identifies the doctrinal and institutional debates—largely missing from 
antitrust discourse today—raised by confronting the commensurability problem 
in antitrust. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At its heart, antitrust law believes it is exceptional. Unlike most 
areas of regulation where rules must trade off costs and benefits 
different in kind, antitrust claims to pursue one single goal: 
competition.1 Courts often endorse the idea that the values traded off 
in competition regulation—the procompetitive effects and the 
anticompetitive effects—are commensurate. For example, courts 
frequently characterize Sherman Act § 1 as condemning restraints on 
 
 1. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in 
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”); Gregory J. 
Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 714 (2014) 
(“[T]he impact of a challenged restraint on the competitive process is the only issue the Court 
considers under the rule of reason.”). 
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trade having a “net” anticompetitive effect, and condoning those whose 
effects sum to a neutral or procompetitive effect. This supposedly 
unitary goal of antitrust—to facilitate competition—allows the law to 
appear to avoid the murky, value-laden compromises struck by other 
areas of regulation. 
But antitrust law is not exceptional. Even within the now-
dominant paradigm that antitrust pursues only economic goals,2 value 
judgments are unavoidable. What are typically offered in antitrust 
cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are rarely two sides 
of the same coin, and there is no such monolithic thing as “competition” 
that is furthered or impeded by competitor conduct. In fact, 
competition—whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes 
associated with competitive markets—is multifaceted. Antitrust law 
often must trade off one kind of competition for another, or one salutary 
effect of competition (such as price, quality or innovation) for another. 
And in so doing, antitrust courts must make judgments between 
different and incommensurate values. 
The incommensurability problem is not entirely unrecognized in 
antitrust discourse, but it is downplayed in a manner harmful to policy 
and doctrine.3 Antitrust scholars acknowledge—and sometimes even 
highlight—the incomparability of the effects they measure.4 Judicial 
opinions occasionally, although less often, contain explicit discussions 
of the disparate competitive values at stake.5 But more often, these 
judgments are implicit. 
 
 2. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). Phrases of this 
ilk are ubiquitous; see, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27 (1984) (“[T]he policy 
unequivocally laid down by the [Sherman] Act is competition.” (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958))). 
 3. Professor Maurice E. Stucke, for example, has a nice, but very brief, discussion of the 
problem in his article Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1375, 1441–46 (2009) (“Economists, much less judicial fact-finders, are ill-equipped to quantify the 
value of different forms of competition, such as inter- and intrabrand competition, static versus 
dynamic efficiency, and a restraint’s impact on that competition.”).  
 4. See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free 
Speech, 95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 36 (2015) (observing that antitrust must sometimes trade off 
incommensurable values associated with free speech and innovation); Philip C. Kissam, Antitrust 
Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1165, 1171–72 (1984) (briefly observing that the Rule of Reason 
“typically will involve [balancing]  incommensurable factors”); Werden, supra note 1, at 755 
(recognizing the problem of incommensurability but declining to explore its significance for his 
defense of “competition” as the unitary goal of antitrust). Cf. Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, 
Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 253, 282 (2010) (noting that 
the costs and benefits of the US’s and EU’s different approaches to antitrust are 
incommensurable). 
 5. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878 (2007) 
(debating the merits of intrabrand versus interbrand competition). 
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The absence of attention to the fact that procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects, as they are presented in an antirust suit, are 
usually incommensurate, and the absence of debate about how to trade 
them off means that antitrust law is under-theorized. Rhetoric of 
commensurability in antitrust has made it unpopular for judges to 
acknowledge the use of value judgments in deciding antitrust cases.6 
This has pushed important debates about those values into the subtext 
of antitrust opinions rather than allowing for the full and open 
discussion that they merit. It has also led to a set of doctrines that 
courts use to avoid the appearance of judgment, which distort antitrust 
litigation usually in favor of defendants. These evasive maneuvers have 
made a mess out of questions such as when the burden of production 
shifts from plaintiff to defendant, which arguments require empirical 
proof or a rigorously defined market, and what kinds of procompetitive 
justifications are categorically illegitimate. 
This Article uses Sherman Act § 1 liability to illustrate the 
incommensurability of most pro- and anticompetitive effects in 
antitrust litigation. Although the problem pervades antitrust law and 
policy, § 1 doctrine nicely illustrates the (false) exceptionalism of 
antitrust. The rhetoric of the Rule of Reason7 (the dominant mode of §1 
analysis) exemplifies the problem: it claims to protect agreements that 
enhance competition and condemn those that destroy it,8 as if 
“competition” referred to one single value that antitrust must promote. 
But below the surface, the cases and rules actually do struggle with how 
to trade off very different benefits and costs of agreements among 
 
 6. See infra Section I.B (discussing the origins and modern manifestations of the use of value 
judgments in deciding antitrust cases). 
 7. The Rule of Reason under § 1 of the Sherman Act—a standard that balances pro- with 
anticompetitive effects—is the standard used for all restraints on trade not subject to per se 
condemnation. Only hard-core price fixing and other cartel-like activities are condemned per se—
that is, without hearing defenses of their efficiency. All other agreements among competitors are 
evaluated under the Rule of Reason, which condemns restraints whose negative competitive effects 
(“anticompetitive effects”) outweigh their benefits to competition (“procompetitive effects”). Those 
that are more “pro” than “anti” pass muster under the Rule of Reason. See, e.g., Cont'l Airlines, 
Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff must show that the 
net effect of a challenged restraint is harmful to competition.”); Werden, supra note 1, at 744, 748–
49. 
 8. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (“[Under the Rule of 
Reason,] the test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition.” (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918))); Nat’l Soc’y 
of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (“[T]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of 
Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that 
suppresses competition.”); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
under the Rule of Reason, the plaintiff should show an agreement “has been to restrict competition, 
rather than promote it”). 
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competitors. Examples include trading off quantitative for qualitative 
measures of consumer welfare, balancing present and future 
competitive effects, and trading off competitive effects on different 
classes of consumers. These latent debates play out in cases considering 
restraints that suppress intrabrand competition while stimulating 
interbrand competition,9 that trade a free market with failures for a 
self-regulated market with suppressed rivalry,10 and that create a “new 
product” by otherwise restricting competition. 
I do not intend to argue that antitrust should take into account 
a broader set of social goals such as wealth redistribution, protection of 
small businesses, or mitigating the evils of bigness.11 These common 
criticisms of modern antitrust run contrary to over three decades of 
consensus among courts—and most scholars—that antitrust ought to 
pursue only economic goals in the form of competition.12 What this 
account intends to do is to point out that this consensus, as it is often 
presented by courts and commentators, contains an important and 
problematic hypocrisy. A focus on purely economic effects is sometimes 
touted as avoiding difficult value judgments,13 but it does no such thing. 
9. Compare Leegin, 551 U.S. at 878 (implying that it was appropriate to trade off reduced
intrabrand competition for greater interbrand competition because “the primary purpose of 
[antitrust law] is to protect [interbrand] competition”), with United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 
U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972) (generally accepting a reduction in intrabrand competition in support of 
interbrand competition, but noting a general “inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, 
destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another 
sector”). 
10. Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 760–62 (1999); Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635
F.3d 815, 819–22 (6th Cir. 2011).
11. For scholars discussing and rejecting non-economic justifications for antitrust
intervention, see Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: 
An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 475–76 (2012); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust 
Modified: Education, Defense, and Other Worthy Enterprises, 9 ANTITRUST, Spring 1995,  at 23, 
25; and Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? 
Answer: The True Consumer, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 350 (2010). 
12. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 909 (stating that the goal of the Sherman Act is to “bring about
the lower prices . . . and more efficient production processes that consumers typically desire” 
through competitive market forces); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (explaining that 
the Sherman Act is intended to promote competition); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
708 F.2d 1081, 1176 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001) 
(same); Adam J. Di Vincenzo, Editor's Note: Robert Bork, Originalism, And Bounded Antitrust, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 821, 833 (2014) (discussing the “enduring consensus” that antitrust serves only 
economic goals); Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure 
Defense To Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243, 254 (1993) (noting that “the courts, 
commentators, and even critics have more or less reached consensus that efficiency is the 
appropriate objective when analyzing antitrust issues”); Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer 
Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 135–36 (2010) (observing that most antitrust 
scholars “now agree that the protection of consumer welfare should be the only goal of antitrust 
laws”). 
13. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 114–15 (2d ed. 1993).
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Nor does this Article argue that antitrust law must be 
completely reformed. I mean to observe that antitrust courts do trade 
off incommensurate values in Rule of Reason cases, and that is as it 
must be. Given that this is the inevitable project of antitrust law, I 
argue that a more honest account of what kind of balancing is involved 
will improve the rationality, transparency, and legitimacy of the law. 
This Article suggests a significant change in the way we talk about 
antitrust law, but I do not argue that the incommensurability of 
competitive effects makes antitrust judging impossible or illegitimate. 
Rather I argue that recognizing the incommensurate nature of the 
values in tension in the typical antitrust case can light a clearer path 
forward. 
Part I defines commensurability and identifies the 
commensurability myth in antitrust law, revealing its origins and 
illustrating its continued prominence in antitrust discourse. It then 
contrasts antitrust with two other areas of law—constitutional law and 
administrative law—where commensurability problems are confronted 
head-on. Part II then illustrates the incommensurability problem that 
pervades § 1 analysis, using cases to illustrate the myth and its 
consequences. Part III identifies the distorting doctrines courts have 
developed in response to the commensurability problem, doctrines that 
have made antitrust less predictable and less fair. Finally, Part IV 
outlines the doctrinal and institutional debates currently missing from 
antitrust discourse that are inevitably raised by the commensurability 
problem. A short conclusion follows. 
I. INCOMMENSURABILITY IN ANTITRUST AND ELSEWHERE 
Rhetoric of commensurability is common in antitrust case law 
generally and § 1 standards specifically. It is implicit in frequently-
invoked images of “net” effect on competition, and in the idea that a 
restriction’s ultimate effect is either to promote or to suppress 
competition. This Part identifies these themes, traces their origins, and 
illustrates their continued dominance. 
In Section A, I define what I mean by commensurate and 
incommensurate, because these terms are often used—in philosophy 
and law—to describe subtly different phenomena. Armed with a 
workable definition of commensurability, Section B then sketches the 
history of the commensurability myth and its current status in 
antitrust jurisprudence. Section C further highlights the 
commensurability myth by presenting contrasting areas of law where 
the commensurability problem is addressed more openly than in 
antitrust. 
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A. What is Commensurability? 
In this Article I do not use “incommensurable” in its strongest 
philosophical sense, which would apply only to values or objects that 
cannot ever be compared or traded off in a rational manner.14 Rather, I 
call “incommensurate” those values that cannot be traded off without 
appeal to another external set of values, some of which may be 
controversial.15 For example, under my definition of 
“commensurability,” apples and oranges are incommensurate because 
choosing between them requires developing a set of criteria—which 
may be contested—for how to compare the fruits. But this does not 
imply that apples and oranges can never be rationally compared. If, for 
example, we could agree that sugar content was the most important 
factor for comparison, with fiber to serve as a tie-breaker, a decision 
maker could quite rationally compare apples and oranges. In contrast, 
euros and dollars are, for my purposes, commensurable; there is a 
standard rate, at any given time, by which one can be converted to the 
other that leaves very little room for debate or judgment in the 
calculation.16 The apples-and-oranges example requires judgment 
about comparative criteria, and the euros-and-dollars does not. 
I do not dispute that markets are capable of making otherwise 
incommensurate values—such as product quality, nutritional value, 
personal pleasure, or self-esteem—commensurate with money.17 Nor do 
I argue that such conversions are illegitimate and undesirable; indeed, 
antitrust is premised on the traditional free market principle that 
consumers, by purchasing according to their own idiosyncratic 
preferences, should set the price for goods under competitive conditions. 
Thus when I argue that quality and price are incommensurate, I do not 
mean that they cannot be made commensurate by market forces. 
I mean that in the typical antitrust case, consumer preferences 
about intangibles such as quality and variety are unobservable, either 
because the defendant is making a counterfactual claim (“without this 
 
 14. See Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 
1172 (1998) (defining incommensurability as incomparability, which precludes justified choice).   
 15. Cf. Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare, Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1998) (“[T]wo goods can always be ranked on some scale.” (emphasis added)). 
 16. Note that my definition of commensurability is a question of degree, since it is possible 
that some people may dispute which conversion rate to use—that posted by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, the European Central Bank, or some third source. My point is that some conversions 
between values require relatively little judgment. When the freedom embodied in that judgment 
is sufficiently small (and where that threshold lies is undoubtedly context-dependent), one may 
call the values “commensurate.”  
 17. See generally Craswell, supra note 15 (arguing against the notion that idiosyncratic 
utility and risks resulting from consumer choices are incommensurable with money). 
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restriction, quality would suffer”) or because data on consumer behavior 
is unavailable, too costly to collect, or unreliable. In other words, the 
values as they are presented to a court are incommensurate. In the 
typical antitrust case, the judge, not the consumer, is in the position of 
trading off values for which there is no uncontroversial conversion rate. 
Judges, just like consumers, can and do make judgments between these 
incommensurate values and so, in the philosophical sense, make them 
commensurate again. The commensurability myth is that those choices, 
because they aim to maximize a seemingly unitary goal, such as 
consumer welfare or competition, can be made without reliance on 
contested (at best) or idiosyncratic (at worst) value judgments. 
B. The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust:  
Origins and Modern Manifestations 
The roots of the commensurability myth can be found in early 
Sherman Act cases, but it is the rhetoric of the Chicago School 
revolution that firmly entrenched the myth in modern antitrust law and 
policy. Thanks to a reordering of antitrust priorities in the 1970s and 
1980s, heavily influenced by Professor Robert Bork, the modern 
consensus among courts is that antitrust vindicates economic goals 
alone, not social or welfare goals unrelated to competition or 
efficiency.18 This realignment led to what many applaud as the 
rationalization of antitrust law, with economic analysis playing a 
starring role.19 But a common error among those embracing the 
economic paradigm is to assume that when economics won out as the 
dominant mode of antitrust analysis, we solved the commensurability 
problem once and for all. 
In an article that would become a lodestar of the economic 
revolution of antitrust, Professor Bork identified a virtue of the wealth 
maximization paradigm of antitrust: avoiding value judgments. His 
 
 18. See Di Vincenzo, supra note 12, at 833 (discussing the “enduring consensus” that antitrust 
serves only economic goals). Some critics have argued that antitrust should be, and perhaps once 
was, designed to trade off disparate values such as fairness and welfare or concentrations of 
political power and production efficiency, Louis Brandeis being perhaps the most prominent figure 
holding this view. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57, 66 
(2013) (observing that Brandeis espoused “a view of antitrust that looks beyond the efficiency 
effects of a particular combination or restraint to the broader social effects of domination of the 
market by a few, large entities”). These arguments, although sometimes still made from a position 
critical of the modern-day antitrust paradigm, have not had much traction in courts since the 
1970s. See supra note 12 and sources cited therein. 
 19. See, e.g., David L. Meyer, We Should Not Let the Ongoing Rationalization of Antitrust 
Lead to the Marginalization of Antitrust, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1175, 1175 (2008) (characterizing 
the realignment of antitrust around economic principles as “highly beneficial”). 
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language was emphatic, and is now archetypal of the many judicial 
opinions endorsing the commensurability myth: 
Because [antitrust] serves the single, unchanging value of wealth maximization it does 
not require the courts to choose or weigh ultimate values in the decision of individual 
cases or in the continuing evolution of doctrine. Neither are the courts involved in making 
comparisons of and choices between persons and groups of persons.20 
His principle of wealth maximization, which he equated with consumer 
welfare,21 promised to save antitrust from value judgments 
altogether.22 
Professor Bork’s singular focus on consumer welfare as the 
guiding goal of antitrust thus offered to transcend ideology at a time 
when antitrust was seen as an excessively political game that “the 
government always wins.”23 The concern for small competitors and 
fairness in competition that had dominated antitrust litigation, at least 
according to Professor Bork, made for unstructured choices for which 
there was “no social science, no set of criteria, which could guide the 
choice in the particular case.”24 His was a message of judicial 
minimalism that was particularly attractive to judges and enforcers 
because it allowed them the legitimacy of using science instead of 
judgment.25 In Professor Bork’s words, the adoption of the economic 
standard in the 1970s transformed antitrust from “social policy” to 
“merely law.”26 
 
 20. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775, 838 (1965). 
 21. See Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 991 (2002) 
(“[Bork] championed total wealth maximization . . . as the goal of antitrust, although he 
confusingly labeled this goal ‘consumer welfare.’ ”). 
 22. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 
7, 10 (1966) (criticizing Learned Hand as assuming a “value-choosing role” in Alcoa and Associated 
Press).  
 23. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see 
also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency 
and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 217–18 (2010) 
(“The Court had read into the Sherman Act an assortment of vague and, ironically, anti-
competitive social and political goals, such as protecting small traders from their larger, 
impersonal (and more efficient) rivals.”). 
 24. Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
242, 246 (1967). 
 25. See Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust 
Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 835 (2014) (noting that Professor Bork’s emphasis on consumer 
welfare “reduced antitrust law to an elegant and precise formula that ostensibly could be applied 
with consistency, accountability, and scientific rigor”); Di Vincenzo, supra note 12, at 829; George 
L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of The Antitrust Paradox: An Essay in Honor of Robert H. Bork, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455, 458, 461 (2008) (noting that Bork’s Antitrust Paradox “explains 
why the consumer welfare standard for antitrust law provides a consistent, normatively 
defensible, and politically removed standard for decision by courts”). 
 26. See BORK, supra note 13, at ix–x. 
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When courts adopted Professor Bork’s singular focus on 
economic effects, they also accepted his rhetoric of commensurability, 
and the myth was born. Antitrust legal opinions since then are rife with 
characterizations of § 1 liability that imply symmetry between pro- and 
anticompetitive effects. Courts will often discuss the “net” competitive 
effect of a restriction,27 a concept that is encouraged by the oft-quoted 
language from Chicago Board of Trade that “the true test of legality is 
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition.”28 Interpreting the Rule of Reason to be an 
inquiry into net effects is a reasonable understanding of this language, 
since if a restriction can suppress or promote “competition,” it would 
seem that “competition” has a single meaning or value that can be 
increased or destroyed. The Court’s language in its 1999 opinion in 
California Dental Association v. FTC29 is typical, and has been quoted 
repeatedly since then: “the [challenged] restrictions might plausibly be 
thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all 
on competition.”30 
In addition to ubiquitous judicial references to “net” competitive 
effects, cases often identify antitrust as serving a single goal—always a 
variation of economic efficiency, competition, or wealth maximization. 
It has become so mainstream to simplify antitrust policy in this manner 
as to be taken for granted. Thus, the references to the single-
mindedness of antitrust policy are usually off-hand: “the sole aim of 
antitrust legislation is to protect competition”31 is typical. And it is 
unexceptional to begin a sentence in an antitrust case with something 
like the following clause: “Assuming as I must that the sole goal of 
antitrust is efficiency or, put another way, the maximization of total 
societal wealth . . . .”32 
 
 27. See, e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(suggesting analysis of an agreement should look to whether it “might plausibly be thought to have 
a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition” (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n 
v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999))); Cont’l Airlines, Inc.  v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508 
(4th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff must show that the net effect of a challenged restraint is harmful to 
competition.”).  
 28. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). This language is quoted 
in hundreds of federal antitrust cases. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203 n.10 
(2010); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963); United States v. Brown Univ., 
5 F.3d 658, 668 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 853 F. 
Supp. 837, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 29. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 30. Id. at 771. 
 31. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975). 
 32. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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Courts so enthusiastically embraced Professor Bork’s invitation 
to rationalize antitrust law that they overlooked a key exaggeration in 
his claim. Adopting economic efficiency as the single goal of antitrust 
law and policy may have settled much of the ideological dispute in 
antitrust, but it did not eliminate all important value judgments in its 
application. And some modern scholars have also encouraged the myth. 
For example, in a 2013 article, Professor Thomas B. Nachbar invokes 
commensurability: 
Another major benefit of a singular focus on efficiency is its compatibility with the kind 
of balancing called for by the rule of reason. Any restraint can be broken down into a 
number of effects, and economics renders those effects perfectly commensurable, and 
hence balanceable. Effects on efficiency can be re-stated as scalars, which vastly simplifies 
rule-of-reason balancing.33 
These proclamations have led courts to (at least claim to) avoid 
value judgments in antitrust cases. For example, in the much-maligned 
Topco34 case that held a horizontal geographic restriction on 
competition to be illegal, the Supreme Court emphasized its “inability 
to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one 
sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another 
sector.”35 Likewise, the Court has declared that “it is not to decide 
whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the 
interest of the members of an industry . . . . [T]hat policy decision has 
been made by the Congress.”36 These statements of judicial 
incompetence and congressional intent emphasize not only that courts 
need not—but that they should not—weigh incommensurate 
competitive values. 
C. Incommensurability in Other Areas of Law 
Two other areas of law, constitutional law and administrative 
law, face significant commensurability problems and, for the most part, 
address these problems more explicitly than antitrust. In these areas of 
law, anxiety about incommensurate balancing leads to thoughtful 
debates about the appropriate weight given each side of the scale. To be 
sure, the values traded off in these kinds of cases are more disparate—
and incomparable—than those in the antitrust context. But as the next 
Part illustrates, value judgments are unavoidable in antitrust, albeit 
among a narrower set of interests. Thus, the maturity of debates about 
 
 33. Nachbar, supra note 18, at 64. 
 34. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
 35. Id. at 609–10. 
 36. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
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disparate values in administrative and constitutional law can 
illuminate the near total absence of similar debates about competitive 
values in antitrust jurisprudence. 
1. Incommensurability in Constitutional Law 
In constitutional law, balancing is a commonly used metaphor 
for what courts do in protecting individual rights against legitimate 
governmental interests in welfare, safety, and social order. Thus, 
judicial opinions deciding the constitutionality of a state statute 
potentially limiting privacy address the state’s interest and the 
individual privacy interests in turn, rather than casting the inquiry into 
a “net” effects analysis on a unitary goal such as happiness or welfare.37 
There is no pretense that “net” is a term that makes sense in the context 
of balancing a private right against a public good, even though judges 
must and do trade off one for the other.38 
The nakedness of the commensurability problem means that 
constitutional scholars and courts debate the incommensurate values 
at stake. For example, there is a particularly robust debate in the First 
Amendment context about when an individual’s speech interest may be 
outweighed by an unrelated state interest.39 Likewise, scholars and 
judges frequently theorize about how safety and privacy should be 
balanced in Fourth Amendment cases.40 These debates help expose 
disagreement about the right way to trade off effects, and also help to 
get the balance “right” by approximating a political or academic 
consensus about incommensurate values where it exists. 
 
 37. Scholars have noted that incommensurability results when you trade off a right against 
a state interest. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 
45 HASTINGS L.J. 785, 794 (1994). 
 38. First Amendment cases often ask courts to trade off an individual’s interest in free speech 
against the government’s interest in social order and safety. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1233, 1270 n.132 (2004) (discussing the legitimacy of weighing the government’s interest in safety 
and social order against First Amendment concerns (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49, 60–64 (1973))). Similarly, Fourth Amendment cases trade off interests in privacy for police 
interests in solving crimes and keeping the peace. 
 39. See Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 
1022, 1045–46 (1978) (discussing the potential conflicts between the constitutional right to free 
press and the right to a fair trial, and suggesting that the weight attributed to each value by the 
Court during the balancing process is “subject to differences of view”). 
 40. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 39–46 
(2013) (discussing how balancing may be better calibrated in the Fourth Amendment context); 
Laura A. Lundquist, Weighing the Factors of Drug Testing for Fourth Amendment Balancing, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1151, 1152–54 (1992) (suggesting a framework for balancing Fourth 
Amendment concerns in drug testing cases).  
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In some cases, the difficulty or impropriety of balancing 
incommensurate values leads scholars and judges to conclude that 
balancing is not appropriate.41 In these cases, a critic may advocate for 
doctrinal solutions that avoid balancing or that give the task to a more 
fitting decisionmaker. For example, dissenting in a dormant Commerce 
Clause case challenging a state’s law tolling the statute of limitations 
for out-of-state businesses, Justice Scalia criticized as incoherent the 
majority’s “balancing” of the in-state and out-of-state interests at stake: 
Having evaluated the interests on both sides . . . roughly . . . , the court then proceeds to 
judge which is more important. This process is ordinarily called “balancing,” but the scale 
analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. 
It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is 
heavy.42 
To Justice Scalia, such a task is unbecoming to a federal judge and more 
appropriately addressed by Congress.43 Such criticisms of 
incommensurate balancing expose its difficulties and risks, and 
underline the need for comparative institutional analysis. 
2. Incommensurability in Administrative Law 
In regulation through the administrative state, incommensurate 
balancing often takes the form of cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit 
analysis is different from constitutional balancing—which never really 
claims to solve the incommensurability problem—because the aim of 
cost-benefit analysis is to reduce apples and oranges to a commensurate 
unit (dollars) and so to approximate an apples-to-apples comparison. 
Thus, cost-benefit analysis is an acknowledgement both that the values 
traded off in administrative regulation are more commensurate than in 
 
 41. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 944–45 (1987). Justice Hugo Black was famous for rejecting the notion of balancing in 
First Amendment cases. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533 (1965) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“[C]onstitutional adjudication under the balancing method becomes simply a matter 
of this Court's deciding for itself which result in a particular case seems . . . the more acceptable 
governmental policy and then stating the facts in such a way that the considerations in the balance 
lead to the result.”); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 164 (1961) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to “abandon what [he] consider[ed] to be the dangerous 
constitutional doctrine of ‘balancing’ ”); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 68 (1961) (Black & 
Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (accusing the majority of pushing balancing “to the limit of its logic”); 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I do not agree that 
laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a congressional or judicial 
balancing process.”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175–77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring) 
(arguing that balancing imperils individual liberty); see also Henkin, supra note 39, at 1023 (“The 
most eminent critic of balancing, all know, was Justice Hugo Black . . . .”). 
 42. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (citation 
omitted).  
 43. Id. 
        
2016] THE COMMENSURABILITY MYTH 15 
the constitutional context (because they can be approximated in the 
same unit of measure) and that they are not entirely commensurate 
(otherwise agencies would not bother with the complicated and 
contested task of reducing costs and benefits to monetary terms). 
This explicit process of conversion from incommensurate to 
commensurate is a source of lively controversy, as it should be. There 
are vigorous debates about the dollar value of social or moral values, 
such as human life or environmental health, to which scholars bring 
many tools from empirical economic modeling to moral theory.44 There 
is likewise debate in many areas of regulation about whether converting 
some values to a dollar scale (and therefore cost-benefit analysis in the 
first place) is ever an appropriate exercise.45 
The sophistication of academic debates about cost-benefit 
analysis reveals the benefits of explicit engagement with 
incommensurability problems. For example, in monetizing the value of 
life and health, some scholars hold that discounting future benefits is 
inappropriate and leads to anti-regulation cost-benefit analyses.46 
Others hold that discounting is an appropriate measure.47 An agency’s 
choice to discount, and by how much, must confront this debate and its 
moral and political implications, leading to better, or at least more 
legitimate, decisionmaking. Similarly, some scholars argue that cost-
benefit analysis in its most common form does not account for 
adaptation—by individuals and firms—to regulation, but it can and 
should be calibrated to measure regulatory costs and benefits that 
reflect these adjustments.48 Other scholars more critical of cost-benefit 
analysis argue that it is categorically inappropriate in a particular 
circumstance, or argue that it has systematically favored politically 
conservative perspectives.49 All of these debates reveal the value 
 
 44. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REG., Jan.–Feb. 
1981, at 33; James V. DeLong et al., Defending Cost-Benefit Analysis: Replies to Steven Kelman, 
REG., Mar.–Apr. 1981, at 39. 
 45. Kelman, supra note 44, at 33; see Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement 
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 388–89 (1981) (arguing against the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in justifying private law rules).   
 46. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 107–17 (2008). 
 47. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
RISK 55 (1992) (“[T]here is no evidence to indicate that we should use a different rate of discount 
when weighting the long-term health benefits of policies that affect life extension as compared 
with other benefit and cost components that these policies may have.”). Likewise, the OMB 
guidelines approve of future discounting. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-431–36 (Sep. 9, 2003) (discussing the use of discount rates). 
 48. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 46, at 85–93, 131–43. 
 49. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 7–12 (2004). 
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judgments inherent in cost-benefit analysis, value judgments made 
inevitable by the incommensurability problem cost-benefit analysis is 
designed to address. This transparency allows for better engagement 
with, and attention to, the motivations and biases that agencies bring 
to regulation. 
II. THE INCOMMENSURATE VALUES OF COMPETITION 
In this Part, I argue that whether the Rule of Reason is seen as 
vindicating consumer welfare or competition as a process, most § 1 cases 
must tackle incommensurability between pro- and anticompetitive 
effects. There is almost unanimous consensus among modern 
interpreters of the Sherman Act that its purpose is to further economic 
welfare by protecting competition.50 There is, however, some debate 
about whether the correct welfare standard under the Sherman Act is 
total welfare, which would include producer and consumer surplus, or 
consumer welfare alone, which is typically equated with consumer 
surplus.51 Under a total welfare standard, antitrust laws would allow 
restrictions on trade that harm consumers, as long as they benefit 
producers by a greater amount.52 Under a consumer welfare standard, 
any restriction that harms consumers, whatever its effect on producers, 
would be condemned under the antitrust laws.53 
This article assumes that the appropriate standard is consumer 
welfare, for two reasons. First, consumer welfare is the more dominant 
paradigm, especially in the courts, but even among scholars. Second, it 
is the easier case for the commensurability myth and so gives my critics 
the benefit of the doubt. In other words, if there is significant 
 
 50. See supra note 12. 
 51. See Orbach, supra note 12, at 137 (“Rather, today, there are two major groups of thought: 
one argues that the term should mean ‘consumer surplus,’ and the other asserts that the 
appropriate meaning is ‘total surplus’ or ‘aggregate welfare.’ ”); Salop, supra note 11, at 336 (“Some 
commentators favor the aggregate economic welfare standard . . . . [O]ther commentators favor 
what I will refer to as the true consumer welfare standard.”). Consumer surplus is typically defined 
as the aggregate difference between consumers’ willingness to pay and the prevailing price. In a 
simple market where one price prevails, consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve 
above price. Similarly, producer welfare is defined as the aggregate difference between price and 
marginal cost. Again, in a simple market where one price prevails, producer welfare can be defined 
as the area above the supply curve (marginal cost curve) and below price. See Orbach, supra note 
12, at 140, for a simple graphical illustration of these concepts. 
 52. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 11, at 483 (advocating for a total welfare standard that 
would deem legal a restraint that benefits the winners more than it harms the losers); Salop, supra 
note 11, at 336 (“[T]he aggregate economic welfare standard would condemn conduct only if it 
decreases the sum of the welfare of consumers (i.e., buyers) plus producers (i.e., sellers plus 
competitors); and without regard to any wealth transfers.”). 
 53.  Salop, supra note 11, at 336 (“[T]he true consumer welfare standard would condemn 
conduct if it reduces the welfare of buyers, irrespective of its impact on sellers.”). 
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incommensurability among pro- and anticompetitive consumer welfare 
effects (as I intend to show), then the problem must be even worse 
among producer and consumer welfare effects. 
Section A provides a typology of the incommensurate tradeoffs 
courts are typically asked to make in Rule of Reason cases. The 
incommensurate comparisons are loosely grouped into three categories: 
tradeoffs between quantitative and qualitative measures of welfare, 
tradeoffs between welfare now and welfare in the future, and welfare 
tradeoffs between different groups of consumers. Section B then 
explores three categories of restraints often challenged under the Rule 
of Reason, illustrating that in the typical case, the pro- and 
anticompetitive effects offered by the litigants trade in different units 
of measure. 
A. Types of Incommensurate Tradeoffs 
A consumer welfare standard, as it is now understood,54 would 
assess a restriction’s effect on consumer surplus, or the aggregate 
difference between price and each consumers’ willingness to pay.55 This 
can be simplified graphically by using a two-dimensional supply and 
demand curve: consumer welfare is the area below the demand curve 
and above price. If a restriction enlarges this area, then it has the effect 
of improving consumer welfare.56 But the mathematical and graphical 
simplicity of using two-dimensional supply-and-demand curves to 
illustrate consumer surplus57 oversimplifies the concept. There are 
many different factors that influence a consumer’s willingness to pay, 
meaning that a single restriction can simultaneously offer benefits and 
 
 54.  There is significant controversy over what Robert Bork meant by using this term in THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, 
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1987) (noting that 
Bork’s usage of the term “as a synonym for economic efficiency [was] an unnecessary and confusing 
redundancy” and contending that the “term consumer welfare is the most abused term in modern 
antitrust analysis”); Di Vincenzo, supra note 12, at 828 (noting the substantial uncertainty as to 
what Bork meant by “consumer welfare”); Orbach, supra note 12, at 136 (“The Antitrust Paradox 
ended the debate over the stated goals of antitrust law and opened a new debate over the meaning 
of the term ‘consumer welfare.’ Antitrust scholars have known for many years that Bork was 
‘confused’ when he used the term ‘consumer welfare.’ ”). Without taking a stand on that debate, I 
adopt the now-dominant use of that term—the aggregate consumer surplus in a market for a 
particular product. 
 55. See Orbach, supra note 12, at 134 n.1 (noting that while the term remains largely 
ambiguous in antitrust, it has a defined meaning in economics as “the benefits a buyer derives 
from the consumption of goods and services.”). 
 56. See id. at 140 (demonstrating this point with a simple graph). 
 57.  This method of illustrating consumer surplus is ubiquitously used in antitrust casebooks, 
treatises, and even opinions. See, e.g., NaBanco v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1266–67 
(S.D. Fla. 1984) (illustrating merchant willingness to pay based on a series of demand curves). 
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costs to a single consumer, or benefit some consumers while harming 
others. To make matters even more complicated, a restriction may 
inflict harm on a consumer today but promise him benefits in the future. 
The result is that in most Rule of Reason cases, the “net” effect on 
consumer welfare cannot be ascertained because what consumers gain 
and what they lose by a restriction are not presented to the court in 
commensurate units of measure. 
1. Quantitative Versus Qualitative Aspects of Consumer Welfare 
The two-dimensional supply-and-demand curves that dominate 
antitrust textbooks depict only two axes of product attributes: quantity 
and price. This abstraction makes clean and obvious the nature of 
consumer surplus: it is the excess in consumers’ aggregate willingness 
to pay above the price offered by the market. But the supply-and-
demand graph is a simplification—albeit a very useful one—of a more 
holistic concept. Price and quantity are not the only relevant 
dimensions of a market, nor is antitrust so limited in the aspects of 
consumer welfare that it can consider. There are two major ways in 
which antitrust doctrine accounts for consumer welfare beyond these x-
and-y axes of price and output. First, and most importantly, the law 
recognizes that consumer surplus is a function not only of price and 
output but also of product quality and the buying experience, broadly 
defined.58 Second, courts recognize that consumers intrinsically value 
choice and variety in markets.59 All of these values—price, output, 
quality, choice, and variety—are appropriate measures of consumer 
welfare, and all potentially play a role in any § 1 case. 
a. Quantitative Measures of Welfare: Price and Output 
Although the two-dimensional supply-and-demand curves 
typically used to illustrate the economics of antitrust are oversimplified, 
there is a good reason why those are the two dimensions chosen for the 
simplification. Price is an essential element of consumer welfare; all 
things being equal, consumers want to pay less for the same products.60 
Output is likewise an essential element of consumer welfare because it 
 
 58. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882–83 (2007) 
(describing how Leegin’s business model focused on a high-quality and personalized shopping 
experience). 
 59. See id. at 927 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that providing consumers with choices is a 
basic objective of antitrust law). 
 60. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 1426 (noting that it is safe to assume that individuals 
“prefer to pay a lower price” and “prefer more of a good rather than less”).  
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is the flip side of price; holding all else constant, a price increase will 
reduce output, and a reduction in output will increase price.61 
Additionally, price and output are relatively easily quantified, and so 
present fewer measurement problems than other dimensions of 
consumer welfare. Thus, price and quantity form the bread and butter 
of consumer welfare analysis. 
b. Qualitative Measures of Welfare: Quality and Variety 
All things being equal, consumers want to pay less for more. But 
the modifying phrase, “all things being equal,” is important in 
recognizing the sacrifices made for the simplicity of the price-quantity 
paradigm. The price-quantity model holds constant product quality, 
which has obvious implications for consumer welfare. If quality changes 
too, then the welfare effect of a price or output shift can no longer be 
taken for granted. And outside of hard-core cartel activity, price 
changes are usually accompanied by changes in product quality or the 
addition or subtraction of product features. 
In a perfect world, quality effects could be quantified and made 
commensurate with price. If consumers perceive a quality improvement 
in a product, then they will be willing to pay more for it. Economists can 
in theory measure this quality premium and turn the price term in the 
quantity-price paradigm into “quality-adjusted price.”62 This could 
address the commensurability problem; if quality deterioration or 
improvement could be captured by the “price” variable, then the two-
dimensional price-output paradigm would account for consumer 
welfare impacted by quality issues. But there are two reasons why 
using quality-adjusted price is unlikely to fully solve the 
commensurability problem in antitrust litigation. 
Data on how consumers react to quality changes is often lacking, 
either because the defendant is making a hypothetical claim about 
quality deterioration in a world without the challenged restriction, or 
because the data is too costly to collect. Further, parsing out the effect 
of multiple quality changes or the addition or subtraction of features—
because rarely are products changed only in one respect at a time—can 
be an econometric challenge that often results in less-than-reliable 
 
 61. See Orbach, supra note 12, at 152 (“In antitrust economics, price and output are variables 
that tend to have a simple inverse relationship.”). 
 62. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing 
“quality-adjusted price” as a variable of consumer welfare); Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 
150, 164 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (discussing an expert economist’s report describing the effect of 
competition on quality-adjusted price); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1306 
(W.D. Mich. 1996) (discussing quality-adjusted price). 
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answers. The result is that rarely are parties to an antitrust suit able 
to make undisputed claims about changes in quality.63 More often, 
claims about product quality are addressed with judges’ gut-level 
instincts about what consumers want from their products. This may be 
appropriate given the lack of hard data, and is probably preferable to a 
system that ignores the effects of product quality on consumer welfare. 
But it does create an apples-to-oranges problem in trading off the 
welfare effects of restraints of trade aimed at improving product 
quality. 
Another limiting assumption of the quantitative price-quantity 
model is that the product in question is homogenous and fungible, and 
therefore the model does not account for the intrinsic value of choice or 
variety. If a market consists of several products that compete with each 
other but that are also different in salient ways, then a single two-
dimensional supply-and-demand curve will not adequately capture the 
effect of competition or the welfare implications of the market. Part of 
this problem could be addressed by summing aggregate consumer 
welfare by drawing separate curves for each differentiated product and 
adding up the consumer welfare from each. But even this burdensome 
exercise would not capture the inherent value in choice and variety on 
the market. Consumers like product variety not only because it allows 
them to satisfy their idiosyncratic tastes (which would be captured by 
summing the curves of individual products), but also because they find 
utility in having and exercising choice in making purchases (which 
would not). Indeed, antitrust can and does recognize that consumers 
benefit from choice,64 even if it creates a commensurability problem 
with more easily-quantified values such as price and quantity. 
2. Consumer Welfare Now or Later: Innovation in  
Products and Distribution 
Consumer welfare also has an intertemporal dimension, 
creating a commensurability problem: How should courts trade off 
future consumer welfare gains for present welfare losses? The price-
quantity model, even if it is able to capture quality through quality-
adjusted price, is limited because it is static in time—it gives only a 
snapshot of consumer welfare. It cannot capture the competitive and 
welfare effects of competitor entry, product innovation, or 
 
 63. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA 
L. REV. 1969, 1980–81(2015). 
 64. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the market benefits of patented products where consumers have multiple choices). 
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improvements to production and distribution over time, yet consumers 
undoubtedly derive value from these dynamic market effects. A market 
that maximizes efficiency now but does not incentivize research and 
development is obviously less beneficial to consumer welfare than one 
that both promotes efficiency given the present state of technology and 
induces investment in lowering costs and inspiring demand.65 
If antitrust vindicates consumer welfare, then it should take 
account of innovation and other intertemporal dimensions of welfare. 
For the most part, antitrust seeks to maximize short-run welfare 
because future benefits are thought to be too speculative to justify 
known and quantifiable harm to consumers.66 But antitrust’s myopia is 
not absolute. The Supreme Court itself has invoked the possibility of 
future payoffs to consumers as a justification for antitrust rules.67 And 
in the lower courts, defendants can and do raise arguments about future 
consumer benefit, such as innovation and competitor entry, which can 
tip the antitrust judgment in their favor.68 
 
 65. Hearing on Antitrust and the New Economy Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, 
109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of M. Howard Morse, Partner & Co-Chair, Drinker Biddle & Reath 
LLP Antitrust Group) http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/ 
Statement_Morse_revd.pdf [http://perma.cc/2TKQ-W7GF] (“Everyone should understand that 
small increases in productivity from innovation dwarf even significant reductions in static 
efficiency over time.” (citing F.M. SCHERER & D. ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
PERFORMANCE 31, 613 (3d ed. 1990))); Orbach, supra note 12, at 157 n.136 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY § 1 (1995)). 
 66. Cf. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 711 (1975) (suggesting a general concern for 
short run, rather than long-term, consumer welfare in monopolization cases). The Court’s holding 
in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013)—that some reverse-payment settlements could 
violate the antitrust laws—could be interpreted as rejecting innovation arguments in the antitrust 
context.  
 67. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004) (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found 
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
 68. See Gen. Motors Corp. 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (consent order) (allowing a joint venture 
between GM and Toyota in part because it would allow GM to learn Japanese production 
techniques). For an example of a case identifying innovation as a policy goal of antitrust, see Atari 
Games, 897 F.2d at 1576. For a policy statement identifying innovation as a goal of antitrust, see 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1 (1995) (describing a goal of antitrust to be “to promote innovation”). 
For academic discussions of antitrust and innovation, see Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative 
Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, in 59 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST 
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION 105, 115–16 (1969) (arguing that 
there is an optimal market size for innovation, and that antitrust can be used to promote it); 
Brodley, supra note 54, at 1025 (“[T]he promotion of production and innovation efficiency should 
be the first economic goal of antitrust.”); Orbach supra note 12, at 156–58 (discussing the 
importance of innovation in antitrust). 
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If antitrust is interpreted as vindicating consumer welfare over 
the long (or even medium) run, then courts encounter commensurability 
problems.69 They must compare a bird in the hand to two in the bush, 
as future benefits are necessarily uncertain. As in other areas of welfare 
analysis, discounting could be used to reduce future benefits to present 
units, but the nature of innovation and competitor entry is sufficiently 
mercurial as to make future discounting almost arbitrary.70 
3. Interconsumer Tradeoffs 
Despite Professor Bork’s statement that an economic welfare 
standard for antitrust would allow courts to avoid “making comparisons 
of and choices between persons and groups of persons,”71 resolving a 
Rule of Reason case often does involve at least implicitly elevating the 
interests of one kind of consumer over another. A purely quantitative 
change to consumer welfare—such as may be effected by a price 
reduction holding quality and other intangibles constant—is likely to 
affect all consumers similarly, or at least in the same direction. But 
other dimensions of consumer welfare are likely to affect different 
consumers differently. 
For example, quality and feature changes are likely to affect 
different consumers differently.72 Quality improvements or the addition 
of product features, unlike price changes, are valued idiosyncratically, 
meaning that a single quality change may improve consumer welfare 
for one set of consumers while doing nothing for another set. Even if 
quality changes were quantifiable, econometric analysis could provide 
no guidance about how to balance a price increase that affects all 
consumers against a quality improvement that only some consumers 
demand.73 Here the apples-to-oranges problem is larger than merely a 
 
 69. Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 4, at 282 (noting that “the short-term benefits of lower prices 
and greater choice are not readily commensurable with the long-term benefits of higher incentives 
to invest in invention”); cf. John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of 
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 238–39 
(2008) (there is often a tension between long-run consumer welfare and short-run allocative 
efficiency). 
 70. Cf. Brodley, supra note 54, at 1029 (discussing the difficulties in measuring future 
benefits from innovation).  
 71. Bork, supra note 20, at 838. 
 72. Cf. Don Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Inframarginal Consumers and the Per Se 
Legality of Vertical Restraints, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 156–57 (1988) (discussing the possibility 
that marginal and inframarginal consumers are affected differently by product quality).  
 73. Cf. Craswell, supra note 15, at 1448 (“[I]t is probably fair to say that the mainstream of 
welfare economics . . . has accepted the proposition that there is no meaningful way to make 
interpersonal comparisons of utility.”); Stucke, supra note 3, at 1442 (“In balancing pro- and 
        
2016] THE COMMENSURABILITY MYTH 23 
lack of data; comparison of the competitive costs and benefits would 
require a theory about how to trade off benefits to one kind of consumer 
against harm to another.74 Likewise, consumers are likely to derive 
idiosyncratic value from having greater variety and choice in a market. 
And innovation is especially likely to affect different consumers 
differently, both because consumers are likely to have different 
preferences for innovative new products, and because the consumers 
who benefit from innovation in the future may actually be different 
people from the consumers of today. 
Any model of antitrust that promotes economic efficiency—
which certainly describes the current antitrust model in the U.S.—
encounters interpersonal commensurability problems.75 But scholars 
tend to only discuss interpersonal incommensurability when 
defending76 or critiquing77 the status quo as opposed to a standard that 
would promote wealth redistribution, which would involve even more 
extreme interpersonal comparison problems. These discussions tend to 
ignore that even the current economic efficiency paradigm requires a 
variety of interpersonal tradeoffs, presenting a range of 
commensurability problems. Some are relatively small, such as the 
commensurability of a dollar to one consumer and a dollar to another, 
and some are relatively large, such as the commensurability of an 
additional product feature to one consumer versus another consumer. 
 
anticompetitive effects, the fact finder does not consider whether one group bears the brunt of the 
anticompetitive effects over time.”). 
 74. Craswell, supra note 15, at 1450 (“[W]elfare economics does not pretend to offer any 
theory of how to justify decisions that affect more than one individual, if some individuals would 
gain while others would lose.”). 
 75. Technically speaking, even price changes affect different consumers differently, since 
welfare models based on individual utility curves are incapable of making interpersonal 
comparisons—a dollar may have more marginal value to one consumer than another. Welfare 
economists avoid this problem by assuming that the marginal value of a dollar is the same for 
every consumer. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
213, 235 (1985) (discussing the “constant dollar” assumption of the Chicago School model of 
antitrust policy). The need for this (questionable) assumption suggests that every attempt to 
measure welfare encounters and assumes away a commensurability problem. For an excellent 
critique of the assumption of dollar-for-dollar commensurability, see id. at 235–37. This article 
does not address this level of commensurability problems—which are prominent in the debate 
about whether antitrust can or should serve redistributive goals—but rather accepts arguendo the 
classic assumption that a dollar has equal value to every consumer. To do otherwise would be to 
reject the economic welfare model of antitrust altogether.  
 76. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703–05 
(1986) (arguing that recognizing wealth redistribution as a goal of antitrust would make the 
interpersonal incommensurability problem even worse). 
 77. See Hovenkamp, supra note 75, at 235–37 (critiquing the notion that efficiency standard 
for antitrust is apolitical, since accepting its “constant dollar” assumption is itself a policy choice).  
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The difference in the magnitude of these commensurability problems 
gets little attention in antitrust cases or scholarship. 
Note that economic science offers little guidance when it comes 
to making the interpersonal tradeoffs required by antitrust law. As 
discussed above, quality and variety are features that can, at least in 
theory, be measured econometrically, because markets are theoretically 
capable of translating them into a measure commensurate with price. 
Of course, the qualifier “in theory” matters a great deal in the antitrust 
context, because often there is little data available to quantify a 
qualitative change. Likewise, the presence of data about how likely 
innovations are to occur, and how consumers would value such 
innovations would, in theory—but often only in theory—address the 
commensurability problem presented by intertemporal tradeoffs. But 
the problem is even deeper than a lack of data in the case of 
interpersonal welfare tradeoffs, where economics as a science has little 
to offer.78 Such judgments—often required by law—are left to other, 
non-scientific decisionmaking processes. 
B. Restraints of Trade Implicating Incommensurate Values 
Courts considering § 1 cases are routinely asked to make 
tradeoffs between values that are, as presented in litigation, 
incommensurate. This section explores three categories of cases—which 
cover the majority of Rule of Reason cases—in which 
incommensurability is often a problem. For each category I describe the 
restraint challenged, its typical competitive effects, and the 
commensurability problem it tends to raise. I then provide examples 
showing the difficulty courts face when deciding these cases while 
attempting to adhere to the myth of commensurability. 
1. Vertical Restraints on Resale 
Today, it is generally accepted that restraints on vertical resale, 
such as resale price maintenance (RPM), can have consumer welfare-
enhancing effects by improving the quality of the buying experience and 
stimulating the provision of services along with the product.79 Vertical 
 
 78. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 1448 (noting that “economics can supply no single metric 
by which gains and losses to different individuals can be ranked”).  
 79. For a full description of how restrictions on intrabrand competition can enhance 
interbrand competition, see Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–
92 (2007) (discussing the “free-rider” problem that results in the under-provision of ancillary 
services and promotional efforts at the retail level, and how vertical restrictions such as resale 
price maintenance can address it). 
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restraints can solve a market failure associated with free riding, which 
can lead to less-than-optimal provision of ancillary sales services 
provided with the product.80 These restrictions suppress intrabrand 
competition (competition among dealers for sales of the same brand) to 
induce robust interbrand competition (competition among different 
brands) in the form of better customer service, more attractive displays, 
and other ancillary sales services. 
Of course these improvements in the shopping experience can 
yield consumer welfare benefits, in the form of product quality (if the 
“product” is defined as including ancillary services), choice, and variety 
of buying experiences. It can also promote innovation in sales and 
distribution methods. But there is also significant evidence that 
practices like RPM raise consumer prices,81 which by itself would 
reduce consumer welfare. Often we cannot know the “but for” prices 
that consumers would pay for the product with and without the 
restriction (and thus with and without the enhanced purchase 
experience), so a court cannot assume that the increase in price provides 
a conversion rate for the enhanced consumer experience. Quality, 
variety, innovation, and price are all important dimensions of consumer 
welfare, but they are not directly commensurable. 
Competition itself could alleviate the commensurability 
problem. As Professor Bork pointed out, if RPM is being used in a purely 
procompetitive manner—that is, if it is being used by manufacturers to 
induce ancillary services that consumers demand—then courts will not 
have to trade off price effects for those services.82 If some consumers do 
not actually want to pay more for the services, then a competitor brand 
will emerge that does not use RPM at all, but allows its goods to be sold 
in “bargain basement” conditions. In this best-case scenario, consumers, 
not judges, would decide between price and quality. And this best-case 
scenario also means more choice and variety for the consumer. 
But if resale price maintenance is being used in some of the 
anticompetitive ways identified by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
 
 80. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890 (noting that resale price maintenance may be justified 
“because discounting retailers can free ride on retailers who furnish services and then capture 
some of the demand those services generate” (citing Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 55 (1977))). 
 81. See, e.g., THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF ECONS., RESALE 
PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 160 (1983) (“[P]rice surveys 
indicate that [resale price maintenance] in most cases increased the prices of products sold . . . .”); 
Hearings on H.R. 2384 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 122 (1975) (statement of Keith I. Clearwaters, Deputy Assistant Att’y 
Gen.) (arguing that minimum resale price maintenance increased prices by 19% to 27%). 
 82. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 473 (1966). 
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on RPM,83 then courts may be in a position of guessing whether the 
price increase associated with resale price maintenance actually 
reflects the value it provides consumers. For example, if a judge 
suspects that RPM is being used to facilitate a retailer cartel, then lack 
of competition among retailers would mean that consumers do not have 
a meaningful choice between retail outlets. The assumption that 
consumers are paying more because they want the associated services 
is no longer justified, and courts are stuck balancing price against 
quality. And certainly there is no reason to believe that all consumers 
want the ancillary services, raising the specter of incommensurate 
interpersonal welfare tradeoffs. 
How these values should be traded off is highly controversial, 
even among members of the Supreme Court. In Continental T.V. v. GTE 
Sylvania,84 the first vertical restraint case of the modern era, the Court 
declared in a footnote that interbrand competition, rather than 
intrabrand competition, was the primary goal of antitrust.85 This 
assertion, often since repeated86 and rarely defended, provides no 
normative justification for such a thumb on the scale, nor any guidance 
for how to judge restrictions that offer minimal benefit to interbrand 
competition at significant cost to intrabrand competition.87 
Almost half the Court implicitly disagreed with Sylvania’s ipse 
dixit in 2007’s Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,88 
the case that reversed the century-old ban on resale price maintenance. 
The Leegin majority emphasized resale price maintenance’s ability to 
combat the free-rider problem and to encourage point-of-sale services 
 
 83. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94 (indicating that retail price maintenance can encourage 
manufacturer and retailer cartels).  
 84. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 85. Id. at 52 n.19 (“Interbrand competition . . . is the primary concern of antitrust law.”). The 
case cites no authority for this proposition. 
 86.  The footnote from Sylvania has been cited by the Supreme Court three times since, and 
dozens of times in lower court opinions. See, e.g., Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., v. Reeder-Simco GMC, 
Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 180 (2006); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 501 (1992); 
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988); Gorlick Distrib. Ctrs., LLC v. 
Car Sound Exhaust Sys., 723 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2013); Toledo Mack Sales & Serv. v. Mack 
Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 227 (3d Cir. 2008); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 
166 (3d Cir. 1979); Nw. Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 87 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at  52 n.19). 
 87. See Stucke, supra note 3, at 1442–43 (noting that in Leegin, “the Court willingly traded 
off the reduction of intrabrand price competition,” and contrasting that holding with the logic of 
Topco in which the Court refused to trade off intra- for interbrand competition because it found it 
“beyond its competency and authority . . . ‘to determine the respective values of competition in 
various sectors of the economy’ ”) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610–
11 (1972)). 
 88. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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and promotion—benefits offered by increased interbrand competition.89 
But Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, emphasized the cost of reduced 
intrabrand competition, citing evidence that resale price maintenance 
raised prices by 19% to 27%,90 increasing the average household’s 
annual retail bills by $750 to $1,000.91 Such a price increase, of course, 
could be compatible with enhanced overall consumer welfare if that 
price increase was offset by a larger increase in consumer satisfaction 
with the sales services and buying experience. The dissent was 
skeptical that qualitative improvements made the price increase 
worthwhile, but the majority did not seem to share this view by not 
discussing the price increases directly. In essence, the majority and the 
dissent made different judgments about how consumers value service 
quality, the brand experience, product variety, and price. 
2. Restraints Creating a “New Product” 
Sometimes a market participant will restrain competition as an 
ancillary effect of creating a “new product.” Defendants can raise “new 
product” arguments—essentially that absent the competitive 
restriction, consumers would be offered one less option and existing 
products would face one less competitor—to save a restriction from per 
se treatment and to defend it under the Rule of Reason. Most new 
product cases stand or fall on whether the competitive restriction is 
“reasonably necessary” to create the product,92 and this question, in 
turn, often depends on an implicit tradeoff between the price effects of 
a restriction and the new or unique character of the product. Because 
parties rarely have data showing either how the restriction affects price 
or how consumers value the new product, “new product” Rule of Reason 
cases typically involve incommensurate tradeoffs. 
 
 89. The majority invoked the footnote from Sylvania, claiming that “antitrust laws are 
designed primarily to protect interbrand competition,” and therefore these restraints should be 
subject to Rule of Reason analysis. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895–96. Note that even the majority’s 
position—which privileges inter- over intrabrand competition—does not totally avoid the 
commensurability problem. By applying Rule of Reason analysis to vertical restraints rather than 
declaring them per se legal, the Court implied that some restraints can be so harmful to intrabrand 
competition as to outweigh any benefits to interbrand competition. 
 90. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 926. 
 92. See Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health 
Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 901–02 (2004); see also William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and 
Antitrust Enforcement: Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 785 
(2001) (“Modern decisions have tolerated horizontal restraints when the restrictions are 
reasonably necessary to facilitate collaboration that improves economic efficiency . . . .”).  
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In NCAA v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents,93 the 
Supreme Court confronted a new product argument that required just 
such a tradeoff between incommensurate values. The defendant, the 
NCAA, had imposed a set of rules on its university members’ college 
football teams that severely restricted the number of games that each 
team could televise.94 Several large schools with popular football teams, 
including University of Oklahoma, filed suit arguing that the rules 
imposed an illegal output restriction on television rights for their games 
in violation of § 1. They claimed that absent the restriction, they could 
sell many more games to television stations and receive more revenue 
to benefit their football program.95 
The NCAA defended the restriction as necessary to sustain 
robust live attendance at games. The NCAA argued that to create the 
popular product known as college football, many restrictions were in 
order—from rules about amateur status to limitations on practice 
time.96 The television restriction was of that order; robust attendance 
at live games was, in the NCAA’s view, an essential element of the 
character of college football.97 Allowing the few large schools with major 
 
 93. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 94. Id. at 93–94 (describing the NCAA “ground rules” as prohibiting any single team from 
appearing on national television more than four times per two-year period, while also requiring 
the television networks to broadcast at least eighty-two different teams during that period). 
 95. Id. at 128 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that without the restrictions, each institution 
would be allowed to sell its television rights to any entity in a free market transaction, enabling 
the large schools to capitalize on their additional value). 
 96. The NCAA Manual explains the role of amateur status as designed to maintain 
intercollegiate sports as “an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral 
part of the student body and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate 
athletics and professional sports.” NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2014-15 NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL 59 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], http://www.ncaapublications.com/ 
productdownloads/D115JAN.pdf [http://perma.cc/X95X-V2QJ]; see also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. 
Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (indicating that the NCAA rules are meant to “prevent 
commercializing influences from destroying the unique ‘product’ of NCAA college football” and 
should not be struck down by antitrust laws); Alan J. Meese, Competition and Market Failure in 
the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1791 (2006) (noting that 
“agreements regarding the academic qualifications of players both before and after their 
admission, as well as agreements on the maximum level of compensation that schools could pay 
such players for their services” are necessary to ensure the amateur character of college sports). 
See Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 
1303, 1307 (1992) (finding instances in which courts have upheld precompetitive NCAA rules as 
promoting the integrity of college football and public interest in the sport). But see Matthew J. 
Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” College Athletics: The Need to 
Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 
21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (observing that the NCAA requires amateur 
status to promote an image of academically-minded student athletes rather than professionals). 
 97. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 89 (1984) (“[A] three-person 
‘Television Committee’ . . . concluded that ‘television does have an adverse effect on college football 
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interest from television stations to dominate the airwaves on Saturday 
afternoons would ruin the sport for everyone, and ultimately erode the 
very qualities that made the sport so popular (and so in-demand by 
television stations) in the first place. In welfare terms, this restriction, 
like other NCAA rules, was necessary to create the “new product”98 that, 
depending on the market definition, either created its own market with 
its own consumer surplus,99 or competed with professional football and 
so increased consumer surplus by offering consumers choice and by 
exerting competitive pressure on pro football. 
Thus, the Supreme Court was faced with a tradeoff between 
incommensurate values: on the one hand, the restriction had obvious 
negative effects on output if output was to be measured by televised 
games.100 That certainly diminished one kind of consumer surplus. But 
the restriction at least plausibly preserved the character of college 
football, which is essentially an element of product quality.101 Thus, the 
Court was asked to trade off the negative surplus associated with 
diminished output with the positive surplus associated with augmented 
quality. 
The Court did not frame its decision in this way, rather it 
attempted to avoid the commensurability problem altogether. The 
Court dismissed the procompetitive argument as pretextual because 
even the games that were televised under the plan were shown live, 
coinciding with other untelevised football games. This suggested to the 
 
attendance and unless brought under some control threatens to seriously harm the nation’s overall 
athletic and physical system.’ ”). 
 98. Of course college football is not “new,” but the “new product” argument applies to actually 
new products and products that could not exist but for the restriction. 
 99. Cf. Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students be Paid to Play?, 65 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 227–28 (1990) (arguing that professional and amateur sports form 
separate labor markets because professional sports do not offer the same educational 
opportunities; professional eligibility requirements practically bar college-age players; and college-
aged athletes often lack the talent to immediately compete at the professional level); Daniel E. 
Lazaroff, The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 
OR. L. REV. 329, 360 n.125 (2007) (suggesting the possibility that “supporters of college teams 
identify more with players who are also legitimate students,” which would create a line of 
demarcation between professional and amateur football leagues). 
 100. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113 (“[T]he NCAA television plan on its face constitutes a restraint 
upon the operation of a free market, and the findings of the district court establish that it has 
operated to raise prices and reduce output.”); Meese, supra note 96, at 1799. 
 101. Meese, supra note 96, at 1793 (“[R]estrictions on horizontal rivalry could actually improve 
the quality of the product offered by the league and thereby enhance consumer welfare.”); Lazaroff, 
supra note 99, at 339 (noting that the Court found price restraints, output restrictions, and 
amateurism rules necessary “in order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product’ ” 
(quoting NCAA, 468  U.S. at 102)). 
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Court that the NCAA did not really care about live attendance.102 But 
just because the rule did not go further and control the timing of 
televised games—perhaps by delaying the broadcast of games until 
after all live games were completed—does not mean that the NCAA’s 
rule restriction on the number of televised games was unrelated to 
preserving live attendance at games not shown on television.103 The 
Court seemed to misunderstand the NCAA’s argument: fans would be 
less likely to attend a less-popular team’s live game if they could stay 
home and watch—for free—a more popular team’s game on TV. The 
more of those games available on TV, the fewer fans attending live 
games. 
This mischaracterization of the NCAA’s argument allowed the 
Court to express its condemnation in terms of output, and to appear to 
dodge the quality claims at the heart of NCAA’s procompetitive 
justification. The Court explained that “[i]f the NCAA’s television plan 
produced procompetitive efficiencies, the plan would increase output 
and reduce the price of televised games.”104 But there was no question 
that the restriction reduced televised output; the question was whether 
this restriction on output also effected an increase in the quality of 
college football viewed holistically, and whether the output restriction 
was outweighed by these quality benefits. The Court’s ultimate 
holding—condemning the restriction as violating § 1—was probably the 
right answer given the severe output restriction it created and the 
dubious benefit it offered to the “character” of college football. But by 
failing to own up to the commensurability problem presented by the 
case and implicitly resolved by its decision, the Court missed an 
opportunity to shed light on how such tradeoffs ought to be struck in 
antitrust.105 
In Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broadcasting System 
(BMI),106 another new product case, the Court faced a similar tradeoff 
but concluded with a much more favorable view of the restriction. BMI, 
 
 102. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 116 (“The plan simply does not protect live attendance by ensuring 
the games will not be shown on television at the same time as live events.”). 
 103. Id. at 115 (observing that the NCAA was worried “that fan interest in a televised game 
may adversely affect ticket sales for games that will not appear on television”). 
 104. Id. at 114. 
 105. For cases challenging the NCAA’s amateurism rules—which present similar 
commensurability problems—see Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1992) (challenging 
the NCAA’s “no-draft” eligibility rule); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(alleging that NCAA rules “are designed to stifle competition”); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 
955, 962–63 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (challenging the NCAA’s rules restricting competition for men’s 
football and basketball players); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) 
(analyzing a challenge to the NCAA’s eligibility rules). 
 106. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
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a defendant in the suit, operated a “ ‘clearing house’ for copyright 
owners”107 that offered “blanket licenses” to television and radio 
programs wishing to use songs composed by its thousands of members. 
The “blanket license” product was thought to overcome the transaction 
costs that had plagued the industry. Prior to the availability of the 
blanket license, television and radio stations would have to contact and 
negotiate with individual songwriters before playing their compositions 
on the air; the difficulty of those negotiations and the low probability of 
artists enforcing their copyrights through individual suits lead to 
rampant copyright violations.108 The blanket license gave television 
stations the right to use any of the songs in the BMI repertoire at any 
time during a program, in exchange for a percentage of that program’s 
revenues.109 
CBS sued BMI, arguing that because BMI was acting as a joint 
selling agency, the blanket license amounted to price fixing among its 
thousands of songwriter members.110 The Court rejected that argument 
and held that a per se rule was inappropriate because of the 
procompetitive effects of the blanket license. The Court extolled the 
virtues of the blanket license as providing a popular “new product”111 
that benefited copyright licensees and songwriters alike, and improved 
upon the atomistic market for song rights that was plagued with 
market failures.112 
Again the Court overlooked key features of the parties’ 
arguments in an effort to avoid the commensurability problem. CBS 
was not asking for a return to a world without BMI and ASCAP acting 
as clearinghouses (or joint selling agencies). CBS wanted BMI to offer 
a different product, a “per use” license that would allow CBS to pay only 
for those songs it used in the course of a program.113 In effect, CBS was 
 
 107. Id. at 5. 
 108. Cf. id. at 20 (noting that without the “blanket license,” individual transactions are 
expensive and composers are singularly responsible for monitoring and enforcement of copyright). 
 109. Id. at 31. 
 110. Id. at 6. 
 111. Again, the product was not “new”; ASCAP and BMI had been selling similar blanket 
licenses for decades. Id. at 5–6. But it is a product that could not exist but for some restriction of 
head-to-head songwriting competition, and so in that sense it is a “new” product relative to a 
market where such a restriction is not allowed. 
 112. See id. at 21 (arguing that a bulk license is necessary to capture efficiencies, including 
reduced costs for transacting and diminished need for extensive monitoring). 
 113. Brief for Respondent at 3, BMI, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (Nos. 77-1578, 77-1583), 1978 WL 
223669, at *3 (arguing that both BMI and ASCAP “have refused to license on a per-use basis, even 
though it would be (i) feasible to do so (since they now distribute royalties to their members on 
a per-use basis), and (ii) less restrictive than the blanket system (since it would permit direct 
licensing to occur)”). 
        
32 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1:1 
arguing that the restriction—artists agreeing through BMI to offer only 
the blanket license and not a per use license—was not reasonably 
necessary to create the product, if the product were understood as the 
right to indemnified spontaneous use of copyrighted material during a 
broadcast. CBS’s argument implied that the per use fee would, like the 
blanket license, solve the market failures of the atomistic market but 
at less of a cost to CBS’s welfare. If CBS were correct, then the 
restriction was not “reasonably necessary” (or ancillary) to the creation 
of the product, and so would be properly subject to per se condemnation. 
By failing to address this argument head-on, and rather focusing 
on the market failure and the value of the new product, the Court 
evaded the incommensurate tradeoff actually required by the case. 
Direct assessment of CBS’s claim would involve trading off the higher 
prices CBS was evidently paying for the blanket license than it would 
for the hypothetical “per use” license, against the degree to which the 
existence of “per use” licenses would erode (if at all) the value of BMI’s 
product: spontaneous, indemnified use of an almost unlimited set of 
songs. The Court’s decision implied that the financial cost to CBS was 
not worth the threat to the quality of the new product, but in failing to 
frame the decision this way, the Court avoided all discussion of 
incommensurate balancing. 
3. Self-Regulatory Restraints that Mitigate a Market Failure 
Rule of reason cases often confront the welfare effects of 
attempts at industry self-regulation, where balancing competitive 
effects usually involves comparing incommensurate values. Many 
common self-regulatory actions—such as limiting advertising, 
standardizing a product across competitors, or restricting how services 
can be priced—relax price competition among rivals and thus tend to 
lead to higher consumer prices.114 Here, the negative effect on 
consumers is rather straightforward, as it was in the resale price 
maintenance example: all things being equal, higher prices reduce 
consumer surplus. But of course not all things are equal, and firms 
defend such restraints by claiming that they contribute to consumer 
surplus by solving one or more market failures.115 Fixing poorly 
 
 114. See Aaron S. Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed 
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1102, 1113 (2014) (demonstrating 
how licensing boards can raise prices by “making entry [into the profession] difficult”). 
 115. Here, I use “market failure” in its broadest possible sense, sweeping in all situations in 
which a free market lacking in any horizontal coordination fails to provide consumers with what 
they really want at a price that satisfies both consumers and producers. Cf. BLAIR & KASERMAN, 
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functioning markets, defendants claim, raises product or service quality 
and better matches consumer with product.116 
Four categories of market failures cover the majority of 
arguments raised by defendants in defense of self-regulation. First, 
information asymmetry, often found in markets for services, can lead to 
a market failure that results in too-low quality products, leaving 
consumers who demand—and are willing to pay for—high quality 
services without any options. Second, a market plagued by 
externalities—that is, when the true costs or benefits of a transaction 
are visited on more than the parties to the transaction—can also result 
in suboptimal quality products. Third, markets with high search and 
transaction costs result in waste that harms both consumers and 
producers. Fourth, in markets where product interaction and 
connectivity is valued, unfettered competition can result in too much 
product variety. Here standardization among competitors can help 
increase consumer welfare. For any act of self-regulation aimed at 
solving one or more of these market failures, a Rule of Reason analysis 
requires trading off price increases for an incommensurate measure of 
consumer welfare. 
a. Information Asymmetry and Externalities 
Some agreements challenged under § 1 are aimed at addressing 
information asymmetries between consumers and producers. 
Information asymmetry can lead to a market failure famously 
illustrated by George A. Akerlof in his article The Market for “Lemons”: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.117 If a market contains 
goods of mixed quality, but consumers are unable to ascertain quality 
differences before purchase, then they will be unwilling to pay a 
premium for what producers describe as high-quality goods.118 If even 
honest sellers cannot attract a higher price for actually better products 
 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 9 (2d ed. 2009) (“[D]epartures from competitive outcomes are viewed as 
“market failures” for which remedial actions may be necessary.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust 
Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 605, 623 (1989) (“Defendants have also attempted to 
introduce quality/harm evidence to demonstrate that their restrictive practices would promote 
competition by improving the quality of care provided to consumers.”). 
 117.  George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970). 
 118. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, BUREAU OF ECON., FTC, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 5–6 (1990). 
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(often referred to as “peaches”),119 then sellers have no incentive to deal 
in peaches, and will offer only minimum quality goods (Akerlof’s 
“lemons”) at the low price that consumers are willing to pay for goods of 
dubious quality. This means that the market for peaches cannot exist 
at all, and only lemons will be sold.120 The unraveling of the peach 
market is a market failure in the sense that consumers may prefer 
peaches to lemons, and would be willing to pay a higher price for them, 
but consumers’ lack of information makes such a transaction—wealth-
enhancing for sellers and buyers—impossible.121 Information 
asymmetry is especially a problem in markets for professional services, 
where quality is difficult to ascertain before (and sometimes even after) 
purchasing a service. 
Professional service markets can also exhibit failures associated 
with externalities. Market externalities occur when the full costs or 
benefits of a product are not borne by the parties to the transaction.122 
In a market with externalities, rivalrous competition can actually erode 
the quality of the product rather than enhance it. For example, when 
the costs of poor medical care are borne not only by the patient but also 
by his employer, the local ER, an insurance company, or the 
government, a patient may be willing to purchase too-low quality 
care.123 Externalization of costs could lead to more low-price, low-
quality transactions than are optimal for society, or than would happen 
in a market where the parties to the transaction internalized all their 
costs.124 
Thus professional restrictions often aim to increase product 
quality and combat the market failures caused by externalities and 
information asymmetry. The fact that the consumer then pays more for 
the service does not indicate that his welfare is reduced because, in 
theory, he is getting more for the higher price. But whereas the increase 
in cost of professional service is relatively demonstrable and 
quantifiable, claims of improved quality from removing market failures 
are often theoretical or subjective, and of course, different in kind. In 
these cases, courts must trade off the incommensurate values of quality 
and price. 
 
 119. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1609–10 (2011)(“[I]f buyers do not know whether 
they are getting a lemon or a peach, they will not pay a peach price.”). 
 120. Akerlof, supra note 117, at 498. 
 121. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 114, at 1115–16, 1147–48. 
 122. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 115, at 375. 
 123. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 114, at 1115. 
 124. Id. at 1102. 
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Further, because professional self-regulation can raise price and 
quality, it tends to harm consumers who are less sensitive to quality 
but prefer a low price and to benefit consumers with large budgets 
demanding high-quality service. Evaluating professional self-
regulation will often require courts to weigh harm to one class of 
consumer against harm to another class, leading to the apples-to-
oranges problem associated with interpersonal comparisons of welfare. 
The Supreme Court confronted these tradeoffs between free and 
(arguably) more functional competition in National Society of 
Professional Engineers.125 The case challenged a professional rule of 
ethics created and enforced by the National Society of Professional 
Engineers, a membership organization that counted the majority of 
licensed engineers among its members. The rule banned competitive 
bidding, defined as the submission of “estimates of cost or proposals in 
terms of dollars . . . or any other measure of compensation whereby the 
prospective client may compare engineering services on a price 
basis.”126 
The restriction had the obvious potential to raise prices of 
engineering services, but the engineers argued against per se 
condemnation of the practice by claiming it had the procompetitive 
effect of raising the quality of engineering services. Specifically, the 
engineers argued: 
Experience has . . . demonstrated that competitive bidding . . . results in an award of the 
work to be performed to the lowest bidder, regardless of other factors such as ability [and] 
experience . . . and that such awards in the case of professional engineers endanger the 
public health, welfare and safety.127 
Although the engineers did not spell out their argument in terms of 
market failures, it is clear that the harm they associated with price 
bidding depended on the presence of information asymmetries and 
externalities in the market. Essentially the engineers argued that price 
competition incentivized low-price, low-quality bidding, which 
consumers purchased either because they could not tell that the work 
offered was low quality (information asymmetry), or because some of 
the cost of dangerous buildings and bridges would be visited on third 
parties (externalities).128 The engineers argued that by disincentivizing 
low-cost bids, their rule fixed these market failures. 
 
 125. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 679 (1978). 
 126. Id. at 683 n.3. 
 127. Id. at 685 n.7. 
 128. See Brief for Petitioner at 54–55, Nat’l Soc. of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (No. 76-
1767), 1977 WL 189266, at *54–55 (discussing not only the direct design costs, but also the lifetime 
costs, maintenance costs, and the potential cost of collapse or other public disaster). 
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The Court was asked to trade off the incommensurate values of 
price (which was very likely to be higher under the rule) with improved 
engineering quality. And because the rule had a blanket application—
almost all engineers belonged to the society and were required to adhere 
to its rules—consumers were not in a position to make the 
incommensurate tradeoff themselves. 
Faced with the prospect of choosing between quality and price, 
or between rivalry or self-regulation, the Court dodged. It ostensibly 
rejected the proffered procompetitive justification altogether as 
“nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman 
Act,”129 seeming to obviate any incommensurate balancing. But at the 
same time, it is clear from the opinion that the Court at least 
entertained the potential gains to quality that consumers may have 
enjoyed from the restriction, because the opinion did not condemn the 
restriction as per se illegal.130 The Court’s declaration that the Sherman 
Act’s “policy precludes inquiry into the question of whether competition 
is good or bad”131 is at odds not only with its refusal to apply the per se 
rule in that case, but with many Rule of Reason cases that accept 
procompetitive justifications that cure market failures associated with 
unfettered rivalry among competitors. 
California Dental v. FTC,132 in which the Court seemed 
comfortable sacrificing rivalry for a better functioning market, is just 
such a case. The dental association, counting the majority of California 
dentists among its members,133 prohibited false or misleading 
advertising, which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found involved 
a de facto ban on advertising price or service quality. The FTC 
presented evidence that in other industries, similar advertising bans 
were associated with higher consumer prices. The dentists invoked 
Akerloff’s “lemons problem” to justify the restriction, arguing that 
unfettered competition in dental advertising would worsen the 
information asymmetry problem in the market for dental services. 
Unlike in Engineers, where the Court seemed to categorically reject any 
 
 129. Nat’l Soc. of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695. 
 130. Within the same paragraph, the Court explained its intention to “adhere to the view 
expressed in Goldfarb that, by their nature, professional services may differ significantly from 
other business services, and, accordingly . . . [e]thical norms may serve to regulate and promote . . . 
competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason.” Id. at 696. 
 131. Id. at 690 n.14; see also id. at 692 (“[T]he purpose of the [rule of reason] analysis is to 
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a 
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an 
industry.”). 
 132. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 133. Id. at 759. 
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argument that competition is bad for consumers, the Court in Cal 
Dental found the quality arguments advanced by the dentists to be 
plausible enough to save the restriction from summary 
condemnation.134 
The dentists’ argument about advertising and the lemons 
problem is somewhat counter-intuitive, and so requires some 
explanation. Truthful advertising can help solve the information 
asymmetry problem, since it can provide a vehicle for communicating 
product quality to the consumer. If the consumers can sort the lemons 
from the peaches, perhaps because they have been well-described in 
advertisements, then the market will function properly, allowing the 
high-quality sellers to charge a premium for their products and the low-
quality producers to sell to the buyers with low ability or willingness to 
pay. Restricting truthful advertising can exacerbate the information 
asymmetry between consumers and producers, and can contribute to 
the lemons problem.135 
But not all advertising is truthful, and especially in the market 
for professional services, claims about quality are difficult to verify. In 
a world where producers can be expected to over-claim without serious 
consequences, advertising can make the information asymmetry 
problem worse. For example, when a patient willing to pay for 
“painless” dental services finds those services to be very painful indeed, 
he feels he actually knows less about the service than he did before 
seeing the advertisement, and he is less willing to pay for dental 
services in the future. High-quality, high-cost dentists cannot attract 
customers in such an atmosphere of distrust, and so all dentists find 
themselves in Akerlof’s market for lemons.136 Thus, restrictions on false 
advertising can combat information asymmetry and mitigate market 
failure. But in practice, advertising restrictions can never perfectly sort 
the truthful from the false advertising; rules will inevitably chill some 
truthful advertising while also reducing puffery and fraud. 
By remanding the case for more thorough consideration, the 
Court essentially asked the lower court to trade off quality and price,137 
 
 134. Id. at 778 (arguing the restrictions may simply be a procompetitive ban on false or 
misleading statements). 
 135. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 114, at 1115 n.101 (discussing a similar line of reasoning 
with respect to occupational licensing requirements). 
 136. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 774–75 (“[T]he recurrence of some measure of intentional or 
accidental misstatement due to the breadth of their claims might leak out over time to make 
potential patients skeptical of any such across-the-board advertising, so undercutting the method’s 
effectiveness.” (citing Akerlof, supra note 117, at 495)). 
 137. Id. (explaining that the lower court should weigh the procompetitive benefits of quality 
advertising against the potential for anticompetitive price increases). 
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implying that, contrary to its proclamations in Engineers, § 1 liability 
sometimes requires courts to trade off free, but failing markets for 
fettered, yet functional ones. In the end, the different outcomes in 
Engineers and Cal Dental are easily justified; the price increase likely 
to flow from a ban on competitive price bidding is probably larger than 
the higher prices associated with advertising restrictions. And the 
presence of governmental regulation in the Engineers case (state 
licensing for engineers and state and local building codes) meant that 
problems associated with information asymmetry and externalities 
may have already been addressed by a less self-interested actor. 
But the Court’s pronouncement in Engineers that the 
association’s defense—that unfettered rivalry was bad for the market—
was a “frontal assault on the policy of the Sherman Act”138 makes no 
sense,139 except as an effort to appear to avoid the inevitable 
incommensurate balancing that cases like Engineers and Cal Dental 
demand. In fact, incommensurate balancing occurred in both cases: in 
Engineers when the Court decided a ban on price bidding was just too 
anticompetitive to outweigh the possible quality benefits, and in Cal 
Dental when the lower court on remand conducted a more thorough 
inquiry into the restriction’s effect on price and quality.140 
b. Search and Transaction Costs 
Firms frequently restrict competition among themselves with an 
eye toward making the market more accessible to consumers. These 
restrictions are aimed at preventing or mitigating market failures 
associated with high search and transaction costs. Evaluating the 
competitive effects of efforts to solve these problems requires balancing 
incommensurate values. 
If the costs of seeking out a product, comparing it with the others 
on the market, and completing a transaction are borne by the consumer, 
then his willingness to pay for the product will be diminished by the 
costs he must incur in purchasing it. When those costs are high, it can 
discourage a significant number of mutually wealth-enhancing 
 
 138. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).  
 139. Scholars have noted that Engineers should not be taken seriously in its language that 
seems to prohibit such considerations under the Rule of Reason. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The 
New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 862 (1989) (suggesting that Engineers should not be 
taken “too literally in rejecting the safety justification offered”). Similarly, Phillip Areeda 
admonished: “I doubt that the Court meant to go so far as to condemn a restraint that actually 
saves lives.” PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 381 (1987). 
 140. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 950–57 (9th Cir. 2000) (ultimately holding 
that the procompetitive effects outweighed the anticompetitive effects). 
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transactions that would be consummated if search and transaction 
costs were low or non-existent. These deterred exchanges represent a 
deadweight loss to society—the consumer and the producer fail to 
realize their joint surplus because it was overwhelmed by the costs of 
finding and entering into the transaction. This kind of market failure 
will not typically unravel the market, as in the case of information 
asymmetry, but it is an example of the market failing to match buyer 
and seller at an otherwise mutually acceptable price. 
Producers have an incentive to address market failures caused 
by search and transaction costs because those costs reduce consumer 
demand for their products. By reducing the consumers’ costs in finding 
and engaging in the transactions, producers can increase demand, 
allowing for higher profits on each transaction and allowing 
transactions that would not otherwise have occurred. And often the 
producers are in a good position to reduce search and transaction costs, 
for example by creating a single marketplace for the product or a central 
repository for information that facilitates comparison shopping. Of 
course organizing a marketplace or standardizing a product listing 
service requires collective action and often involves creating rules for 
inclusion and exclusion of competitors. When competitors use these 
opportunities to self-deal, their restrictions can raise price or restrict 
output. 
For example, realtors often combine their efforts to create a 
multiple listing service (MLS) that provides up-to-date, centralized, and 
uniform information about houses for sale.141 Allowing such one-stop 
shopping benefits consumers by allowing them to quickly comparison 
shop and saves them time and effort in finding the right house.142 For 
at least one class of consumers—those who highly value convenience, 
lack the means to research homes for sale, or place a premium on their 
 
 141. Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2247, 2293 (2007) 
(“Real estate agents often combine through realtor associations to create a multiple listing service 
(MLS), in which all of the available properties in a particular geographic area are listed in a 
centralized registry.”); see, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 142. Robert W. Hahn, Robert E. Litan & Jesse Gurman, Bringing More Competition To Real 
Estate Brokerage, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 86, 95–96 (2006) (“Collecting all of the listings for a given 
region in one place significantly reduces the amount of time buyers and sellers—and their 
brokers—have to spend gathering information that is crucial to potential transactions.”); Mark S. 
Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection Process in an Internet Age: Obstacles to Maximum 
Effectiveness and Policy Options, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 183, 186 (2000) (“Databases, like the real 
estate industry’s multiple-listing services (“MLSs”), offer consumers access to a dramatically 
broader set of options than any traditional store or salesperson's memory could hold. They also 
permit shoppers to sort these options according to dozens, if not hundreds, of attributes.”). 
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leisure time—the MLS can significantly improve their purchasing 
experience. 
But the standardization required to create an MLS means 
competitor realtors must agree on how much and what kind of 
information will be offered to consumers, which can restrict the terms 
of competition in the housing market. Further, competitors must 
control access to the list to incentivize realtor participation. Unfettered 
access to the list may permit free riding by realtors who wish to use the 
valuable resource without contributing their own information to it. 
Thus, many multiple listing services require realtors to share their own 
information as an “ante” to using the list at all.143 Finally, realtors may 
want to preserve the value of their list as accurate and honest by 
restricting membership only to those realtors in good standing. Each of 
these acts of restriction and exclusion has the potential to decrease price 
competition.144 Evaluating MLS services under the Rule of Reason thus 
requires balancing consumer values that trade in different units of 
measure. 
In Realcomp II, LTD. v. FTC,145 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
FTC’s decision condemning a multiple listing service’s exclusion of 
homes listed by low-cost agents offering less than the full package of 
traditional broker services. The defendants claimed that the low-cost 
providers were free riders, and that exclusion of free riders was 
necessary to the very existence of the list.146 The opinion weighed the 
harm to the competitive process—excluding low-cost competitors—
against the arguments offered that the restriction promoted the 
competitive process by excluding free riders.147 The court had an easy 
time of it, since, as it turns out, this particular free-rider argument 
made no sense; the low-cost providers contributed (albeit indirectly) to 
the listing service in the same way all members did.148 But a legitimate 
free-rider argument would have put the court in the position of having 
to trade off apples and oranges. 
Another category of horizontal restraints on trade aimed at 
combatting transaction and search costs are rules establishing 
 
 143. Cf. Leslie, supra note 141, at 2293 (presenting the analogy between MLS and traditional 
tying services, suggesting that undesired but required membership is tied to desired access). 
 144. See, e.g., Hahn, Litan & Gurman, supra note 142, at 96 (discussing the potential for 
anticompetitive practices through MLS, including controlling access to the services in an effort to 
discourage brokers from charging lower fees). 
 145. 635 F.3d 815 (2011). 
 146. See id. at 835. 
 147. Id. at 829–36.  
 148. Id. at 834 (rejecting the procompetitive justification of excluding free-riders as “not 
legitimate, plausible, substantial, and reasonable”). 
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marketplaces and exchanges. Marketplaces and exchanges create 
centralized locations and standardized systems for consummating 
transactions and can thereby reduce costs on both sides of the market, 
much like multiple listing services. They also afford competitors an 
opportunity to relax price competition by setting the who, what, where, 
and when of exchange. Assessing the competitive effect of competitor-
created marketplaces requires trading off incommensurate notions of 
consumer welfare: price and convenience. 
A good illustration of the commensurability problem raised by 
competitor-controlled marketplaces is the case that established the 
most famous formulation of the Rule of Reason, 1918’s Board of Trade 
of Chicago v. United States.149 The Board of Trade, run by competitor 
purchasers of grain, was the largest grain market in the world. Trade 
occurred both during the open hours of the market—from 9:30 to 1:15—
and after the market closed. But whereas the official market hours were 
open to both members and to the public, only members could trade after 
hours.150 The market was bifurcated into a thicker market during the 
day, and a thin market after the exchange closed, where presumably 
the few member purchasers were able to exert market power to 
artificially bid down the price of grain.151 The restriction challenged in 
the case was designed to combat the problem of monopsony in this after-
hours market by fixing the after-hours price at the last price traded at 
in the regular hours market.152 The restriction was challenged under § 
1 as illegal price fixing.153 
Did the restriction in Board of Trade of Chicago promote or 
hinder competition? It did both, but in different ways. It increased 
competition in the daytime market by promoting two conditions 
associated with competitive markets: numerous buyers and sellers. 
Prior to the rule, member purchasers had an incentive not to bid during 
the day, when they had to compete with the general public, and instead 
wait until the market closed, when they could exert their monopsony 
power to their advantage.154 And since members could purchase on 
 
 149. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 150. Id. at 236 (describing the public, “regular session” compared to the private, “special 
sessions”). 
 151. Cf. Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, 
Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 n.111 (2010). 
 152. Bd. of Trade of Chi. at 237 (explaining the “call rule”—the restriction challenged in the 
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next day at the last trading price at the close of the public market). 
 153. Id. at 238. 
 154. Cf. Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Minor 
Progress on an Important Issue, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 775, 797 (2012). 
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behalf of others after the market closed, even the general public would 
prefer not to participate in the daytime market if it could get a member 
to bid on its behalf in the evenings. By hobbling this purchaser cartel, 
the restriction made the daytime market more attractive to all market 
participants and so increased the volume of trading,155 likely driving 
price down. 
But the restriction also suppressed all price competition in the 
after-hours market. And, together with all the rules that created the 
grain market in Chicago—from opening hours to membership policy—
it tinkered with the free-market process by allowing competitors to set 
potentially self-dealing limits on who could make deals and when. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that the rule’s benefits to 
competition in the official grain market justified restricting competition 
in the after-hours market, and approved the restriction under what 
would become known as the Rule of Reason. That decision was perfectly 
sensible, but it implied a value judgment about which market, and 
which kind of competition—free but failing competition or fettered but 
functional competition—was more valuable under the circumstances. 
c. Product Standardization 
A final category of restraints vulnerable under § 1 are those 
aimed at reducing product differentiation. Where product 
interconnectivity is valued, or where simultaneous use of products is 
desirable, atomistic competition can lead to more product variety than 
consumers demand. In these markets it is common for competitors to 
combine their efforts to develop a standard with which all producers 
will comply.156 
Standardization offers obvious benefits to consumer welfare by 
increasing the usefulness of products (an element of product quality). 
And it can stimulate product innovation by making interface and 
interaction possible, leading to more complex and sophisticated 
technology that consumers want. But the ways in which standards 
threaten consumer welfare are significant and typically 
incommensurate with the benefits. First, standardization can reduce 
consumer welfare by eliminating incompatible features that some 
consumers want. Second, and relatedly, standardization harms 
consumers by reducing variety and choice. And third, because the 
 
 155. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 240 (observing that the rule “brought into the regular 
market hours of the Board sessions, more of the trading in grain ‘to arrive’ ”). 
 156. Standard-setting is facilitated by the Standard Setting Organization Advancement Act. 
See 14 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012). 
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standard setting process gives competitors an opportunity to exclude 
firms that are poorly positioned to comply with the standard, 
standardization can reduce the number of competitors and lead to 
higher prices and restricted output. Courts considering a § 1 challenge 
to an agreement on a standard must trade off these incommensurate 
values in measuring competitive effect. 
Such tradeoffs are ubiquitous in high-tech industries,157 but the 
phenomenon of standardization stimulating demand is also observable 
in other kinds of markets. In Continental Airlines, Inc., v. United 
Airlines, Inc.,158 competing airlines at Dulles airport coordinated 
around a single overhead luggage size limit so that the security stations 
at the airport, which serviced all airlines, could use a single template to 
measure luggage as it passed through x-ray machines. Absent 
coordination, security officers would have to ask individual passengers 
which airline they were flying and switch templates, leading to delays 
and frustration.159 The preferred experience for consumers was a 
streamlined, quick trip through security, which required coordination 
among competing airlines as to the size and shape of the baggage 
template. 
The size agreed on by the majority of the airlines operating at 
Dulles was smaller, however, than that preferred by Continental 
Airlines. Continental had invested in planes with large overhead 
capacity and was marketing to its customers the convenience of 
traveling without having to check baggage.160 Continental sued, 
arguing that the standard unfairly restricted its ability to compete on 
overhead space.161 Although the district court summarily condemned 
the restraint after a “quick look” (an abbreviated form of the Rule of 
Reason),162 the Fourth Circuit reversed, essentially arguing that the 
 
 157. For example, standard-setting is ubiquitous in the wireless communication industry. If 
manufacturers of wireless-enabled devices competed without coordination, then each firm would 
produce devices compatible  with only a particular kind of wireless signal. The demand for wireless 
products would obviously be less in such a market than in a market where the device 
manufacturers, and perhaps the developers of wireless signals, had coordinated around one 
compatible system, allowing all consumers to use their wireless products everywhere. See Apple, 
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 911–12 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 158. 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 159. Id. at 512 (noting that this was particularly troublesome at Dulles Airport, which had 
only two security checkpoints and therefore caused several “bottlenecks”). 
 160. Id. at 505. 
 161. Id. at 507. 
 162. The “quick look,” first established by the court in the 1970s, is a truncated version of the 
Rule of Reason that is something less than a full market analysis. Some have likened the §1 
liability to a spectrum, with per se on one end, full-blown Rule of Reason on the other, and quick 
look in the middle. 
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district court had failed to consider the market failure that would occur 
without standardization of baggage size.163 
Like so many opinions that confront commensurability 
problems, the Fourth Circuit’s decision did not detail the different and 
incommensurate competitive effects of the restriction. But it is clear 
from the facts of the case that any Rule of Reason analysis (including a 
“quick look”) would have to balance the convenience offered by the 
standard template against the additional benefit Continental 
passengers would receive from having more overhead luggage space. 
This comparison would involve not only trading off two 
incommensurate aspects of the quality of the flying experience (speed 
of security versus luggage convenience), but it would also involve 
trading off the harm to one class of consumers (Continental passengers) 
against benefits to another (passengers of other airlines). And the Rule 
of Reason would also have to account for the ways in which such 
standard setting would suppress innovation in airline travel, such as 
Continental’s development of more overhead luggage space for its 
passengers. The court rightly remanded for a more detailed analysis of 
these tradeoffs,164 but it did not note, as courts seldom do, that the 
tradeoff would involve incommensurate comparisons. 
III. THE DANGER OF THE COMMENSURABILITY MYTH:  
DOCTRINES OF AVOIDANCE 
Since the commensurability myth has made overt value 
judgments—for example between quality and price, between consumer 
value now and later, and between different classes of consumers—
appear illegitimate, it should not be surprising that courts have 
embraced doctrinal elements of the law that help them avoid, or at least 
appear to avoid, incommensurate balancing. Some avoidance moves 
could, at least in theory, truly obviate the incommensurability problem, 
and these should be used when appropriate. But too often these 
doctrines of avoidance do not really avoid the commensurability 
problem at all, but merely relegate it to the subtext of a decision, leaving 
the value judgments untheorized and undefended. 
The full list of avoidance moves is long. It includes procedural 
decisions such as lower courts punting Rule of Reason decisions to a 
 
 163. Cont’l Airlines, 277 F.3d at 513 (suggesting that the standard templates would promote 
a service not otherwise available at this particular airport). The court even seemed to say that it 
believed consumers preferred streamlined security procedures to larger overhead luggage 
capacity, and for that reason the restriction was procompetitive. See id. at 514. 
 164. Id. at 516–17. 
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jury, appellate courts remanding for further consideration, and the 
Supreme Court denying certiorari. It also includes Daubert decisions to 
exclude expert testimony essential to a pro- or anticompetitive 
argument. It also includes the aggressive use of increasingly stringent 
requirements on pleading. And it also includes the use of a “least 
restrictive alternative” analysis, which courts use to condemn 
restrictions whose effect could be achieved through a less 
anticompetitive means.165 
Here I focus on three categories of avoidance techniques that are 
somewhat specific to antitrust, and that have at least some doctrinal 
pedigree. First, courts often use “burden shifting” in § 1 cases to avoid 
side-by-side comparison of pro- and anticompetitive arguments, rather 
than as a tool to weed out unmeritorious cases. Second, and somewhat 
relatedly, courts often find the presence of any plausible procompetitive 
argument to allow a restriction to pass muster under the Rule of 
Reason, thus creating a kind of per se legality that avoids overt 
balancing. Third, courts often place unreasonable demands on 
plaintiffs—in the form of empirical evidence and unassailable market 
definitions—in order to avoid considering the defendant’s 
procompetitive (and usually incommensurate) argument at all. 
A. The Burden-Shifting Paradigm and Avoiding the  
Appearance of Judgment 
Although early formulations of the Rule of Reason seemed to call 
for a direct balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects, unstructured 
balancing quickly came under heavy attack as an unworkable and 
unwieldy standard.166 Most criticisms of unstructured balancing focus 
on difficulties in measuring effects,167 but the incommensurability of 
pro- and anticompetitive effects are likewise a reason to disfavor open-
ended balancing. In the 1980s, coinciding with the reorientation of 
antitrust around an economic standard, courts (with the help of 
scholars) developed a solution: impose a series of burden-shifts on 
 
 165.  See generally C. Scott Hemphill, The Less Restrictive Alternatives Shortcut (Nov. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2668269 [http://perma.cc/WPR8-VAXC] 
(describing variations on the Least Restrictive Alternatives test and noting their effects on 
litigation). 
 166. See 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 389 (3d ed., 2006). 
 167. See, e.g., id. at 397 (observing that there is almost never enough information about a 
competitive restraint to “quantify the magnitude” of its effect); COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR 
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION ON THE MERITS 11 (2005), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RFH-TUA7?type=source] 
(discussing challenges of evaluating the magnitude of changes in net consumer welfare, even 
assuming it were possible to determine whether they were net pro- or anti-competitive). 
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parties to a § 1 suit, reserving balancing for worst-case scenarios where 
both sides carry their burdens. 
In theory, burden-shifting could help judges with the 
commensurability problem presented by the Rule of Reason. It could be 
used to force parties and judges to identify the precise harms and 
benefits on either side, and if neither side had a logical argument about 
helping or harming competition, it could speed resolution of the case. 
But instead, empirical research has shown that the burden almost 
never shifts even in the first instance, suggesting something is amiss 
with the “burden-shifting” framework itself. The commensurability 
myth at the heart of § 1 is at least partly to blame. 
1. The Rise of the Burden-Shifting Paradigm 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chicago Board of Trade is often 
cited for its formulation of the Rule of Reason. The Court explained that 
for those restraints not subject to the per se rule, courts should engage 
in an all-things-considered inquiry into the reasonableness of the 
restraint. The opinion suggested courts should consider: 
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before 
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.168 
Although Chicago Board of Trade seemed to make relevant all facts 
particular to the business and all kinds of evil that the restraint is 
designed to address, today only arguments about economic or 
competitive effect are accepted on both sides of the scale.169 
Even this modification left the rule without enough structure for 
fair and predictable application because the economics of a restraint 
could be complex and were almost always contested. In response to this 
problem, courts and academics began to spell out a “structured Rule of 
Reason” that offered to avoid the “wilds of economic theory.”170 Today, 
numerous versions of this structured Rule of Reason abound,171 but they 
all share a similar structure: they impose a series of burden shifts on 
 
 168. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 169. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 166, at 389; cf. supra note 12 and sources cited 
therein. 
 170. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 622 (1972). 
 171. Formulations of the burden-shifting paradigm include “quick look” review, see Cal. 
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763 (1999); “inherently suspect” analysis, see Polygram 
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2005); and the “truncated Rule of Reason” 
(California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). Each differs slightly, 
but their basic structure—shifting burdens between plaintiff and defendant to show anti- and 
procompetitive effects—is the same. 
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the litigating parties in an effort to avoid head-to-head comparison of 
pro- and anticompetitive effects in all but the closest cases. Although 
originally associated with “quick look” review, most courts and critics 
agree that all levels of Rule of Reason scrutiny, from “quick look” to 
“full-blown” market analysis, call for structured burden-shifting.172 
Essentially, to carry its initial burden, the plaintiff must first 
show a plausible anticompetitive effect of the restraint.173 Then the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate procompetitive 
argument in favor of the restraint.174 The plaintiff then has an 
opportunity either to rebut the defendant’s justification or to argue that 
the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the claimed 
procompetitive effect—sometimes this is called the “least restrictive 
alternative” test.175 Only when the plaintiff and defendant have both 
met their burdens must the court “balance” the pro- and 
anticompetitive effects.176 That burden-shifting could reduce reliance—
or at least the appearance of reliance—on balancing incommensurate 
values made the framework especially appealing to those judges who 
saw their role in antitrust litigation as staying out of value-laden 
judgments. 
2. Burden-Shifting Comes Up Short 
Although it is popular to write opinions according to the burden-
shifting paradigm—so much so that one scholar has commented that 
“rule of reason balancing is perhaps the greatest myth in all of U.S. 
antitrust law”177—closer observation reveals that burden-shifting is 
doing less work than its proponents claim. In his impressively 
comprehensive empirical study of all 495 rule of reason cases decided 
between 1977 and 1999, Professor Michael Carrier set out to prove that 
“balancing,” although nominally the primary mode of rule of reason 
analysis, almost never happened.178 And so he did: in only 4% of cases 
 
 172. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule 
of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 760 (2012) (describing burden-shifting); Muris, supra 
note 139. 
 173. Gavil, supra note 172, at 760. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of 
Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 583 (2009). 
 176. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 166, at 390. 
 177. ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE: CASES CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 207 (2d ed. 2008). 
 178. Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 16 BYU L. REV. 
1265, 1267 (1999). 
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did the court ever actually reach the balancing phase.179 The rest were 
disposed of at an earlier inflection point. But in the process he found 
something else: that burden-shifting itself was extremely rare. His 
study found that in 84% of cases the plaintiff did not carry its initial 
burden and thus the burden never shifted to the defendant.180 When he 
updated the study a decade later, his results were even starker. Ninety-
seven percent of rule of reason cases decided between 1999 and 2009 
never progressed beyond the plaintiff’s prima facie case.181 Of the 3% 
that did survive the initial shift, two-thirds ended in head-to-head 
balancing.182 
This paucity of actual burden shifts could mean that the burden-
shifting paradigm has lent much-needed structure to § 1 analysis, and 
revealed that the overwhelming majority of antitrust plaintiffs have no 
plausible anticompetitive argument when they walk through the 
courthouse door.183 This may be part of the explanation, but there is 
also reason to believe that the commensurability myth has put pressure 
on judges to dismiss cases quickly, before fully considering the 
competitive arguments on both sides. Writing opinions in a manner that 
suggests the burden never shifted at all has advantages in an 
environment where incommensurate balancing is seen as illegitimate. 
We may therefore expect judges to seek out rules and doctrines 
that make it especially difficult for the plaintiff to carry its initial 
burden. A close reading of the cases bears out this prediction. Early 
formulations of the structured rule of reason suggested that the 
plaintiff’s prima facie burden was light: a plaintiff must show only that 
there is a significant anticompetitive effect, theoretical or empirical, 
associated with the defendant’s restriction.184 But when courts began to 
consider the details of what was required to make this showing, the rule 
became progressively less liberal. The requirement of “actual effects” 
 
 179. Id. at 1269. 
 180. Id. at 1268. 
 181. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule Of Reason: An Empirical Update For The 21st Century, 16 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009). 
 182. Id. at 827. This research bears out Professor Gavil’s observation about the “myth” of 
balancing, but it also bears out the observation that the Rule of Reason is merely a euphemism for 
“defendant wins”: between 1977 and 2009, defendants won in 98% of the cases. 
 183.  This is certainly a popular view of the burden-shifting paradigm. See Feldman, supra 
note 175, at 576 (interpreting Professor Carrier’s results as showing that courts rarely perform 
balancing because one side has failed to show competitive effect and citing sources coming to 
similar conclusions). 
 184. Philip Areeda, The Rule Of Reason—A Catechism On Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 
571, 582 (1986) (suggesting that a plaintiff need only show that the defendant engaged in activity 
that can restrain trade significantly, or which can result in impairment of consumer welfare which 
is likely to be significant). 
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evidence, discussed below, is an example.185 Another technique to make 
the burden shift harder is to perform unacknowledged balancing at the 
initial stage, effectively asking the plaintiff to put on more than a prima 
facie case. Opinions accepting or rejecting a plaintiff’s initial case are 
frequently infused with analysis of the defendant’s justification, and so 
implicitly perform the very balancing burden-shifting is meant to avoid. 
For example, when a plaintiff challenges a restriction that 
arguably solves a market failure, courts will analyze the market failure 
when considering whether the plaintiff has made an initial showing of 
competitive harm.186 California Dental is an obvious example: there the 
Court explained that because the market for dental services could suffer 
from market failures caused by information asymmetries, and because 
the dental association claimed that the restrictions were tailored to 
prevent misinformation, the FTC had failed to raise a sufficient 
anticompetitive effect in the first place.187 But because an argument 
about solving a market failure goes to the procompetitive potential of 
the restraint, it should have been dealt with at the second shift when 
the defendant must show procompetitive effects.188 
Lower court case law provides several additional illustrations of 
implicit balancing at the initial burden stage. In Barry v. Blue Cross of 
California,189 the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to vertical 
arrangements between Blue Cross and participating physicians, 
including an agreement not to refer Blue Cross patients to non-Blue 
Cross physicians without patient consent. After extensively analyzing 
and crediting Blue Cross’s procompetitive arguments, the Court 
 
 185. See infra Section III.C. 
 186. See e.g., Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866, 872 (9th Cir. 1986); Nat’l Cable 
Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 625–26 (D.D.C. 1991); cf. Monsanto 
Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 580–81 (N.D. Miss. 2004) aff’d and remanded, 459 F.3d 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (though Monsanto was nominally the plaintiff in this suit, the defendant farmers 
raised Monsanto’s alleged antitrust law violation as a defense and thus had the burden of initially 
showing competitive harm). 
 187. The Court held that the Rule of Reason requires courts to “identif[y] the theoretical basis 
for the anticompetitive effects and consider[ ] whether the effects actually are anticompetitive” 
before the burden shifts to the defendant. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999) 
(emphasis added). 
 188. This defect may be inherent in burden-shifting in the first place. Even courts intending 
to follow the burden-shifting paradigm closely may find themselves discussing market failure in 
considering the plaintiff’s initial burden because the question cannot be parsed so cleanly. After 
all, a strict burden-shifting regime would have courts asking a rather pointless question: whether 
in a market without any market failures (which is not, according to the defendants at least, this 
market) the restriction would be anticompetitive. Of course a restriction that successfully 
confronts a market failure at minimal cost to competition serves antitrust’s goals, and so it is 
awkward for courts to claim, even as a prima facie matter, that there is an anticompetitive 
potential to the restraint. 
 189. 805 F.2d at 867–68. 
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concluded that “[t]herefore, the agreements do not have any prohibited 
anticompetitive effects,”190 and so did not shift the burden. The 
Northern District of Mississippi was even more brief in its treatment of 
anticompetitive arguments in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,191 in which it 
held the Scruggses192 to an initial burden of proving “an unreasonable 
restraint of trade,”193 conflating the ultimate balancing standard with 
the initial burden. It found, in one sentence, that the burden had not 
been met.194 
Similarly, in a case challenging the same blanket license 
agreement at issue in BMI, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia implicitly considered procompetitive effects when evaluating 
the plaintiff’s claim of anticompetitive effects.195 The court found that 
the plaintiff had had not alleged that a restraint existed at all, because 
licensees were still free to individually negotiate with artists.196 To 
claim that the blanket license involves no restraint at all is to ignore 
that the license is a product of a horizontal agreement among thousands 
of songwriters to offer a specific product under specific terms. The fact 
that parties were still free to individually negotiate mitigated the 
anticompetitive effects of the restraint, and so should have been 
considered only after the initial burden shift. 
The conflation of pro- and anticompetitive effects at the initial 
stage undermines the “structure” claimed for burden-shifting and 
requires the balancing of incommensurate values in an implicit—and 
thus opaque—manner. It is too facile, therefore, to read Professor 
Carrier’s research as proof that “balancing” very rarely happens in § 1 
cases or that burden-shifting has obviated the need for value judgments 
in all but 2% of Rule of Reason cases. That judgment is often happening 
without the court acknowledging the need for any balancing at all. 
 
 
 190. Id. at 872. 
 191. 342 F. Supp. 2d 568. 
 192. Typically the plaintiff bears the initial burden to show anticompetitive effects, but in 
Scruggs the roles were reversed because it was the defendant that raised the Sherman Act §1 
claim as a counterclaim in a patent infringement suit. 
 193. Id. at 580. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 625–26 (D.D.C. 
1991). 
 196. Id. 
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B. Ancillarity and Per Se Legality 
Relatedly, judges sometimes use the very presence of 
procompetitive justifications as a complete defense in Rule of Reason 
cases. While this move ostensibly avoids head-to-head balancing, it does 
not avoid the commensurability problem; any judgment that a 
procompetitive effect legitimates an anticompetitive practice per se 
implies that the procompetitive value—which likely is different in kind 
from the anticompetitive effect alleged—is always more important. 
That judgment implies a choice between competing incommensurate 
competitive values, but is almost never accompanied by a discussion or 
defense of that choice. 
The idea that procompetitive potential always trumps 
anticompetitive effect has old roots that can be traced to a decision that 
predates the Rule of Reason itself. That case, United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co.,197 is often credited with ancillarity analysis,198 which 
in modern doctrine can save a restriction from per se illegality in favor 
of Rule of Reason analysis. But often a finding of ancillarity is 
tantamount to per se legality, and Professor Bork has argued that this 
is rightly so,199 perhaps because it avoids incommensurate balancing. 
This move, however, implies a value judgment between 
incommensurate measures of competition and welfare, albeit in a tacit, 
unexamined way. 
Judge Taft, writing for the Sixth Circuit in Addyston Pipe, 
explained that the test of legality under the Sherman Act for 
agreements restraining trade was whether they were “merely ancillary 
to the main purpose of a lawful contract.”200 He justified this rule as 
avoiding the indeterminacies of estimating “how much restraint of 
competition is in the public interest, and how much is not.”201 
Essentially, Judge Taft argued that ancillarity analysis avoided direct 
balancing of often incommensurate measures of pro- and 
anticompetitive effects, an exercise he characterized as “set[ting] sail 
on a sea of doubt.”202 Although the ancillarity defense endorsed by 
Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe did not prevail as the dominant mode of § 
 
 197. 85 F. 271, 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
 198. See Werden, supra note 1, at 753 (“[Taft’s] nascent ancillary restraints doctrine divided 
all trade restraint into just two categories—ancillary and prohibited.”). 
 199. Professor Bork advocated per se legality for horizontal restraints and boycotts ancillary 
to an otherwise procompetitive venture. See BORK, supra note 13 at 263–79 (horizontal restraints); 
id. at 330–44 (boycotts).  
 200. 85 F. at 282. 
 201. Id. at 284. 
 202. Id. 
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1 analysis, it was resurrected by courts during the economic 
reorientation of antitrust in the 1970s and 80s as a way to avoid per se 
condemnation and to earn the more lenient Rule of Reason analysis. 
But at least in the case of vertical restraints, a finding of 
ancillarity—that the restraint on intrabrand competition is ancillary to 
a purpose to promote interbrand competition—is often enough to 
declare the restraint lawful per se. Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, writing 
fourteen years after non-price vertical restraints as a class were spared 
per se condemnation and made subject to the Rule of Reason, studied 
the analysis of the forty-one vertical cases decided in that interval.203 
He found that almost half were resolved in favor of the defendant 
without any consideration of intrabrand competitive effects, and thus 
without any balancing. In these nineteen cases, the courts decided the 
issue based entirely on the possibility of benefit—or at least lack of 
harm—to interbrand competition.204 Similar observations have been 
made about the treatment of vertical price agreements since 2007, when 
Leegin spared them from per se condemnation.205 
These cases imply that benefits to interbrand competition, no 
matter how small, always trump costs to intrabrand competition, no 
matter how large. That itself is a judgment between incommensurate 
measures of consumer welfare. Rather than discuss the virtues and 
vices of such a presumption, courts use Taft’s ancillarity framework to 
appear to avoid choosing at all. This avoidance move allows important 
and contested value judgments to fly under the radar, and allows courts 
to appear to avoid the commensurability problem while actually 
resolving it with a thumb on the scale in favor of legality. 
C. Inconsistent Demands of “Actual” Evidence 
Another popular technique used by courts to avoid appearing to 
balance incommensurate values is to demand empirical evidence of 
anticompetitive harm. In fact, it is far from clear that § 1 liability 
actually requires empirical proof of competitive harm through higher 
prices, decreased output, or even empirically-supported market power. 
But several Supreme Court cases have left sufficient doubt on the 
question that many lower courts feel free to demand what the Court has 
 
 203. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 
ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 73–75 (1991). 
 204. Id. 
 205. These cases have essentially adopted Professor Bork’s prescription, relying on Taft’s 
ancillarity framework, that vertical restraints be subject to near per se legality. See D. Daniel 
Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and Per Se 
Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1003–04 (2014). 
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confusingly called “actual evidence” from plaintiffs and dismiss their § 
1 claims when they do not have it. Summary dismissal is attractive 
because courts can then avoid balancing and thus the appearance of 
judgment between incommensurate values. 
It is relatively uncontroversial that a full-blown Rule of Reason 
analysis requires some form of empirical evidence of competitive 
harm.206 Such evidence can come in two forms. A plaintiff can show 
harm indirectly by proving (empirically) market power and allowing the 
court to infer competitive harm from the restriction.207 Alternatively, 
the plaintiff can show empirical evidence of competitive harm—
typically through higher prices—and skip the market definition and 
market power analysis.208 But many (perhaps most) Rule of Reason 
analyses fall short of “full-blown” status; they are some form of “quick 
look” located on the spectrum of analytic intensity between the Rule’s 
extreme poles. Here, the requisite empirical showing from a plaintiff is 
uncertain and inconsistent. 
On the one hand, there is ample support in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that the plaintiff need not show empirical evidence of 
harm at all; theoretical harm can suffice. The leading case here is 
Engineers, which held that the price-bidding ban was sufficiently 
obvious in its anticompetitive effect to make further empirical proof of 
harm unnecessary.209 Likewise, the competitive harm condemned in 
NCAA was not exactly empirical in nature; the Court did not define a 
market, nor did it require rigorous econometric evidence of the 
restriction’s effect.210 Taken together, these cases could be understood 
to mean that empirical proof—through market power or actual effects—
is (at least sometimes) unnecessary in many Rule of Reason cases. Some 
lower courts have applied this logic and condemned restraints under 
 
 206. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Comment, The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving 
Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 499, 526 (2000) (describing full-blown rule of reason analysis as 
“requiring empirical proof of anticompetitive effect or economic proof of market power”). 
 207. Gavil, supra note 172, at 755 (“[T]he market power of a combination may be so obvious 
that no elaborate evaluation is needed and rule of reason analysis may therefore be ‘truncated.’ ” 
(quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 16–17, NCAA 
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271))). 
 208. Actual higher prices or restricted output is seen as evidence, a fortiori, of market power, 
which is defined as the ability to raise price or reduce output anticompetitively, thus a separate 
showing of market power is unnecessary. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38 (1984) (citing 
Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)). 
 209. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (“[N]o elaborate 
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an 
agreement.”).  
 210. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100. 
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the Rule of Reason without rigorous market definitions or econometric 
analyses of effects on price or output.211 
On the other hand, the Court’s opinions in California Dental and 
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD)212 cast significant doubt on 
that conclusion. In IFD, the Court condemned a rule, passed and 
enforced by a federation of dentists that made up about 85% of the 
state’s practicing dentists,213 that prohibited dentists from sharing x-
rays with insurance companies.214 The Court emphasized the fact that 
the plaintiffs were able to show that the insurers were “actually unable 
to obtain compliance with their requests for submission of x rays,” 
which the court characterized as “actual detrimental effects” 
evidence.215 This case standing alone does not mean that a plaintiff 
must show “actual effects” evidence to succeed under the Rule of 
Reason; rather, the opinion could mean that such evidence is 
sufficient—but not always necessary—to carry a plaintiff’s burden. 
But the Court’s subsequent holding in California Dental placed 
that interpretation on shaky ground. There, although the Court 
acknowledged that a “theoretical basis for anticompetitive effects” can 
suffice, its holding—that the theoretical anticompetitive effects of an 
advertising ban were insufficient to shift the burden to the defendant—
seemed to say the opposite.216 Indeed, some lower courts have 
interpreted California Dental and IFD as requiring “actual evidence” to 
shift the plaintiff’s burden.217 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the 
California Dental case on remand is an extreme example: there the 
 
 211. See, e.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 362–68 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that the “net anticompetitive effects of [defendants’] practices were obvious” without 
empirical proof); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (condemning the NCAA’s 
restrictions on assistant basketball coaches’ salaries without defining a market or determining 
through empirical means that salaries would be higher absent the restrictions). 
 212. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465–66 (1986). 
 213. Id. at 449. 
 214. The insurance companies had demanded the x-rays as a way to contain costs. Id. at 449–
50. 
 215. Id. at 460 (quoting 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 166, at 429). 
 216. See Gavil, supra note 172, at 757–59 (“[S]ome of the language used by the Supreme Court 
in California Dental appeared to limit [quick look Rule of Reason] to cases involving evidence of 
actual anticompetitive effects.”). 
 217. See, e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc. 651 F.3d 1118, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that although “it is true that the arrangement provides a cushion that may arguably affect 
incentives to compete, that alone, absent evidence of actual anticompetitive impact on pricing, is 
not sufficient” to resolve the issue on a “quick look” basis); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour 
Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 832 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that “[b]ecause ‘the contours of the market’ here are 
not ‘sufficiently well-known,’ ” quick look was an inappropriate mode of analysis) (quoting 
Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 961 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
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court rejected even empirical evidence from the FTC about the effect of 
advertising bans because the studies examined a different industry.218 
The ambiguity in the case law about how much “actual evidence” 
(of competitive effects or of market power) is required to qualify for 
quick look review or satisfy the quick look standard allows lower courts 
significant leeway in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. High burdens on the 
plaintiff to show market power219 and other demands of empirical 
evidence are useful if courts wish to avoid the appearance of 
incommensurate balancing, but they distort § 1 litigation by holding 
plaintiffs to a burden of “actual evidence” while allowing defendants to 
prevail with only theoretical benefits to competition or welfare.220 
IV. TOWARDS A COMMENSURABILITY DEBATE:  
WHAT’S MISSING FROM ANTITRUST THEORY AND  
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The commensurability myth means that judges do not engage 
explicitly with the value judgments inherent in most Rule of Reason 
cases. But what are those value judgments, and what would exposing 
the incommensurability of competitive values mean for antitrust theory 
and institutional design? 
Section A of this part identifies two debates that are largely 
missing from substantive antitrust law and argues that confronting 
them would improve antitrust decisionmaking. First, the 
commensurability myth has allowed courts and scholars to avoid 
decisions about when qualitative aspects of consumer welfare—such as 
product quality, innovation, and variety—should outweigh more 
quantifiable effects like price and quantity. Second, the myth has 
allowed courts to avoid developing a framework for when competitors 
may suppress rivalry for the sake of a more functional market. A more 
robust theory of industry self-regulation will add much-needed 
rationality and transparency to antitrust law. 
 
 218. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring “some . . . 
relevant data from the precise market at issue in the litigation”). For a critique of this holding, see 
Thomas L. Greaney, A Perfect Storm On the Sea of Doubt: Physicians, Professionalism and 
Antitrust, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 481, 494 (2002) (describing the Ninth Circuit as 
“unjustifiably wary of drawing inferences from those studies as to the likely effects of advertising 
restraints by dentists”). 
 219. See Bhan v. NME Hosps. Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1414 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiff failed 
to make required showing); see also Mary Kay, Inc. v. Dunlap, No. 3:12–CV–0029–D, 2012 WL 
2358082 at *6–7 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2012) (dismissing a § 1 claim for failure to empirically define 
a market). 
 220. See, e.g., Cal. Dental, 224 F.3d at 949, 956. 
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Section B discusses the institutional design implications of 
confronting the commensurability myth. I first explore the possibility 
that commensurability problems point towards more administrative 
and less judicial decisionmaking in antitrust, observing that expert 
agencies may have an advantage in tackling the quantification 
problems that give rise to incommensurability. I then address the 
possibility that because antitrust often involves choosing between 
competing values, the legislature should take on a larger role in 
regulating competition. Finally, I explore the arguments for leaving at 
least some antitrust decisionmaking to the courts. I conclude by 
suggesting that commensurability problems point towards a blend of 
decisionmaking across the branches, but that the current balance is too 
focused on courts. 
A. Incommensurability in Antitrust: Hidden Debates 
In §1 law and policy, debates about how to address the 
incommensurability problem are mostly hidden and implicit, resulting 
in unsatisfactory judicial decisionmaking about what competitive 
values should be prioritized. Two specific examples are discussed here. 
Without providing answers to these debates, this subsection frames 
these essential questions and illustrates the need for their further 
development. 
1. When and How to Trade Off Qualitative Effects for Quantitative? 
Although consumers benefit both from quantitative measures of 
welfare—such as quantity and price—and from qualitative measures—
such as product quality, innovation, and variety—antitrust often 
emphasizes the quantitative over the qualitative. For example, the 
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, issued 
jointly by the FTC and the DOJ, put price effects first and allow 
efficiency arguments (that might go to such qualitative benefits as 
“improved quality, enhanced service, or new products”) only after they 
pass a very high bar of proof.221A comprehensive study of health 
 
 221. FED. TRADE COMM’N & THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 24 (April 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-
competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ADP-J33L] [hereinafter “COLLABORATIONS 
GUIDELINES”]  (noting that because “[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify,” they must 
be verified and may not be “vague or speculative”). 
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industry antitrust cases revealed “a lack of attention to quality data,”222 
and found that when courts did engage with quality arguments, they 
did so “at an abstract rather than a specific level.”223Arguments about 
innovation often seem similarly disfavored, perhaps because courts 
perceive patent and copyright law as better suited to balancing 
innovation concerns. This antitrust-IP dichotomy has led many courts 
to avoid crediting arguments about innovation as procompetitive.224 
But antitrust’s disfavor of qualitative welfare arguments is far 
from complete. The Supreme Court’s opinion in California Dental may 
be the most prominent example of a successful qualitative welfare 
argument.225 By accepting the dentists’ claim that advertising 
restrictions would improve the quality of dental care, the Court 
essentially elevated quality over price concerns.226 The Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion on remand made this judgment even starker when it held that 
empirical evidence about price effects (by analogy to a similar industry) 
offered by the FTC was trumped by theoretical quality arguments made 
by the dentists.227 Variety and choice, as qualitative benefits to 
consumers, are likewise persuasive to antitrust courts,228 and 
occasionally even arguments about innovation carry the day in §1 
cases.229 
 
 222. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 545, 615–16 (2002). 
 223. Id. at 621. 
 224. Id. at 628 (observing that the tradeoffs between “competition” and “innovation” appear to 
be resolved by defining the domain of antitrust law to exclude disputes classified as patent or 
regulatory); Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy For Innovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 637, 651 (2011) (noting that “[a]ntitrust courts defer to patent law within the scope of the 
patent right, largely contenting themselves with policing the edges to make sure that parties do 
not expand the right beyond its scope” and concluding that “patent law, not antitrust law, 
determines how innovation will be protected”). Similarly, the Court’s recent holding in Actavis 
could be read as a rejection of the idea that antitrust can vindicate consumer welfare in the form 
of possible future innovation. See Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl 
Shapiro, Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16, 19–20 (“[T]his sort of argument was part 
of the fundamental approach of the dissent, which favored an exception to antitrust law premised 
on the presence of a patent to encourage innovation.”). 
 225. See infra Section II.B.3.a. 
 226. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999). 
 227. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 957 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the FTC’s empirical 
evidence suggesting that comparable restrictions on legal advertising contributed to increased 
price of legal services in favor of the dentists’ argument that the advertising restrictions are 
theoretically procompetitive). 
 228. Hammer and Sage attribute this to the fact that “[c]hoice is a consideration that is easy 
for economists and antitrust lawyers to understand.” Hammer & Sage, supra note 222, at 623. 
 229. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(suggesting that when patented innovation arises in a market with a variety of competing 
products, it may encourage “innovation, industry and competition” as opposed to giving rise to any 
antitrust concerns). 
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Scholars and courts should be more explicit about when and how 
to trade off these different dimensions of consumer welfare. One salient 
difference between these sources of consumer welfare is their relative 
measurability: the welfare effects of price and quantity, although not 
easily ascertained in every case, are more quantifiable than those 
associated with innovation, variety, and product quality. But according 
empirical quantitative arguments and theoretical qualitative 
arguments equal weight may make it too easy for the side raising 
qualitative arguments to make its case. This asymmetry may justify a 
heavier burden of proof on qualitative arguments; this is arguably the 
approach of agencies, as epitomized by the Collaborations Guidelines.230 
But where that threshold of proof should lie is not at all obvious, and 
deserves more scholarly and judicial attention. Too heavy of a burden 
would make qualitative arguments too often unsuccessful precisely 
because parties will usually lack hard empirical proof of quality 
improvements or increased innovation. 
Another consideration in trading off dimensions of consumer 
welfare is the problem of subjectivity. Some sources of consumer 
welfare, such as low prices and increased innovation, can be reasonably 
assumed to benefit all consumers; others, such as quality 
improvements, will benefit only some consumers. For someone who is 
disinclined to allow restrictions that benefit some consumers at the 
expense of others,231 this asymmetry may be another reason for favoring 
price effects over claimed quality benefits. But others may believe that 
whatever is better for consumers as a whole should be allowed by the 
antitrust laws, having no quarrel with an asymmetry of benefits as long 
as some consumers receive an aggregate benefit greater than the 
aggregate cost to the rest.232 
 
 230. See COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 221, at 24 (explaining that efficiencies, 
which could theoretically take many qualitative forms, must be quantifiable and verifiable to be 
“cognizable” in defending a restraint). 
 231. Someone subscribing to this view could describe himself as favoring Pareto optimal 
antitrust policy. Economist Vilfredo Pareto defined a transaction as efficient if it made at least one 
actor better off without making any actor worse off. Pareto efficiency is often associated with the 
consumer welfare standard, since it would bless a restriction benefitting producers only if it did 
not also harm consumers. See B. Lockwood, Pareto Efficiency, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008), 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000024&edition=current&q=pareto
%20efficiency&topicid=&result_number=1 (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) [http://perma.cc/N26H-
WN9L]. 
 232. Someone subscribing to this point of view could describe himself as believing in a Kaldor-
Hicks efficient antitrust policy. Economists Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks defined a transaction 
as efficient if it increased total welfare. Some transactions, such as a restriction that harms 
consumers but benefits producers by a greater degree, satisfy Kaldor-Hicks efficiency but not 
Pareto. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
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Others may want to dodge this question altogether by asking, in 
the case of quality claims, whether the product faces competition from 
another set of products technically outside of the market defined in the 
case. Where that is true, one may be less worried about the subjectivity 
problem in the first place. An example may be the NCAA cases where, 
although courts typically define the market as college sports,233 the fact 
that consumers may choose professional sports instead makes 
qualitative arguments about the “character” of intercollegiate sports 
especially convincing.234 
Striking the right balance between qualitative and quantitative 
measures of consumer welfare may depend on the industry. For 
example, where the costs of inferior quality are especially high, such as 
in the healthcare industry, some may argue that quality claims should 
receive an especially warm welcome from antitrust courts. And some 
may argue for similar deference to qualitative arguments in industries 
ripe for market failures that lead to less-than-optimal quality, 
innovation, or choice. Others may take the opposite perspective, and 
point out that industries where low-quality products are dangerous and 
that are ripe for market failures—such as professional services like 
healthcare—tend to be regulated by other sources of law. In industries 
where occupational licensing and quality oversight have addressed 
qualitative measures of consumer welfare, some may take a skeptical 
view of antitrust defenses identifying non-price benefits. 
Finally, antitrust should confront the innovation problem head-
on, rather than vacillate between deference to intellectual property law 
and naïve assertion that competition, as vindicated by antitrust law, 
solves all innovation problems.235 Here the scholarship has surpassed 
the doctrine; courts should directly engage with arguments made by 
scholars like Mark Lemley about the appropriate balance between 
antitrust law and intellectual property rights.236 Again, this balance 
 
1539, 1569 (1989). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is therefore associated with the “total welfare” antitrust 
standard. See also Craswell, supra note 15, at 1450–56 (discussing the Kaldor-Hicks solution to 
the problem of incommensurability between individuals, and noting its shortcomings).  
 233. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 (1984). 
 234. Indeed, the NCAA has successfully raised this “character” argument several times. See 
id. at 101–02; Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 747 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
 235. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
406 (2004) (arguing that competition promotes the “risk taking that produces innovation and 
economic growth”); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421 (D. Del. 
2006) (noting that innovation, including patented technology, inherently inflicts harm on 
competitors, but antitrust laws should not intervene so long as it remains “a matter of consumer 
choice”). 
 236. Lemley, supra note 224, at 648. 
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may be industry specific, since different industries require different 
competitive incentives to optimize innovation.237 
Setting these thresholds and determining the optimal balance 
between qualitative and quantitative arguments about consumer 
welfare will require judgment, not science, and will benefit from an 
open debate. That is not to say that all courts and commentators are 
ignoring these issues; they underlie many current antitrust disputes, 
but they do so in a way that is latent and therefore less transparent. 
The paradigm of “net” competitive effects has made overt discussion of 
these issues rare. 
2. When Does a Market Failure Justify Restraints  
Suppressing Rivalry? 
The reorientation of antitrust around an economic standard 
changed the way courts saw restraints on rivalry, departing from the 
previous doctrine that was inhospitable to arguments that market 
failures could make uncoordinated competition inefficient.238 But 
current doctrine lacks a coherent theory about when a market failure 
justifies suppressing rivalry and which restraints pass muster under 
the Rule of Reason. Development of such a theory has been hindered by 
commensurability rhetoric that instructs courts to maximize 
competition, without defining that term. A lively debate about when one 
kind of competition (coordinated, but functional competition) is better 
than another kind (atomistic, rivalrous competition) would help carve 
out a space for industry self-regulation without ceding all control over 
competition to those who have the most to gain by self-dealing. 
A fundamental step in setting the terms of this debate is to 
define “competition.” At times, courts use it to mean “rivalry,” such as 
when the Court censured the engineers for their argument that 
competition (rivalry) was against the public interest.239 At other times, 
courts use the term to refer to a well-functioning market, as in 
California Dental when the Court championed the procompetitive 
potential of the dentists’ restraints on advertising.240 Yet another 
possible definition of “competition” would refer to the presence of 
conditions that economists associate with perfect competition, such as 
numerous buyers and sellers, good information, and internalized costs 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. See generally Meese, supra note 96, 1775–1808. 
 239.  Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–95 (1978). 
 240. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999).  
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and benefits.241 This meaning is perhaps what the Court had in mind in 
Chicago Board of Trade when it applauded the restriction’s tendency to 
thicken the market with more sellers and buyers, and cited that fact as 
suggesting that the restriction “merely regulates and perhaps thereby 
promotes competition.”242 Ultimately, the debate about the meaning of 
“competition” will likely reveal that all three of these definitions are 
relevant and important, and that the Rule of Reason requires balancing 
them, but the first step is to be clear that they represent distinct facets 
of “competition.” 
Armed with a better sense of the meaning(s) of competition, 
antitrust courts and commentators should then develop a theory about 
what circumstances justify private restrictions on rivalry. At least one 
scholar believes that the Sherman Act forbids private regulation of 
competition altogether,243 and although his opinion seems likely to be 
in the minority,244 it is striking how little debate there is about this idea. 
More robust is the debate about whether market failures justify 
competitive restraints and, if so, which kinds are particularly 
appropriate for redress through private contracts in restraint of trade. 
Professor Alan Meese has several interesting pieces on these questions, 
ultimately suggesting that restraints addressing market failures from 
“a poor assignment of property rights” resulting in a “misalignment of 
incentives” should be seen as procompetitive.245 In contrast, he argues, 
restrictions designed to address failures caused by “high information 
costs and consumers’ inability to perceive their own interests” should 
be suspect under § 1.246 Other scholars have taken up the relationship 
between market failure and § 1 liability, but their work proposes very 
controversial changes to existing law247 or focuses only on market 
 
 241. See Sam D. Johnson & A. Michael Ferrill, Defining Competition: Economic Analysis and 
Antitrust Decisionmaking, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 583, 587 (1984) (describing the conditions associated 
with perfectly competitive markets). 
 242. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 243. See Nachbar, supra note 18, at 69 (arguing that antitrust is “[n]ot merely a rule of 
economic regulation, [but] a rule against private regulation”). 
 244. Daniel A. Crane, “The Magna Carta of Free Enterprise” Really?, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 
17, 19 (2013) (finding it “difficult to credit the paper's theory that the property/regulatory 
distinction supplies a general, positive theory of U.S. antitrust doctrine”). 
 245. Meese, supra note 96, at 1807; Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of 
Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 168–70 (2003). 
 246.  Meese, supra note 96, at 1807. Yet another approach is suggested by Engineers: market 
failures already addressed by government regulation (such as professional licensing or building 
codes) should not be used to justify restraints on rivalry. 
 247. See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 54, at 1021 (arguing that antitrust law should “recognize an 
efficiencies defense that would allow limited-term collaborative action to correct market failure, 
subject to ex ante scrutiny and ex post audit”); Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: 
Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. 
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failures in a particular industry.248 In any case, none of this scholarship 
has induced courts to enter the fray, and the judiciary is an important 
voice in this debate. 
Another important debate missing from the free-or-functional 
market controversy is the extent to which the process behind the 
restraint’s creation and enforcement should matter for antitrust 
liability. The process behind a restraint’s enforcement proved 
dispositive in the Supreme Court’s 1963 opinion in Silver v. New York 
Stock Exchange,249 but the Court has not addressed the question since. 
Perhaps Silver is right that the anticompetitive nature of a restraint on 
rivalry is intimately related to the process of its creation and 
enforcement, and that the possibility of meaningful dissent from a 
restraint’s victims makes all the difference.250 But it could also be 
argued that the process of private restraint creation is too opaque and 
unaccountable to ever serve as a factor in liability. These questions 
deserve more scholarly and judicial attention.251 
Calibrating the tradeoff between rivalry and self-regulation will 
also require drawing limits on how far self-regulators can go in 
suppressing rivalry. Section 1 case law illustrates that a relatively 
minor market failure cannot justify permanent destruction of all 
rivalry, but the cases are not clear on where the line lies between 
permissible self-regulation and unreasonable restraint of trade. Some 
scholars have suggested that courts should emphasize the duration of 
restrictions, with temporary restrictions receiving more leeway under § 
1.252 Many scholars and judicial opinions hold that restrictions on one 
dimension of competition that leave free competition along other 
important dimensions are better than ones that foreclose all forms of 
 
L. REV. 849, 851 (2000) (“[A]ntitrust law should recognize a defense for private acts that restrain 
‘competition’ under the traditional antitrust analysis but advance total welfare.”); Christopher R. 
Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-
Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243, 291 (1993) (arguing for a pure “efficiency” standard even for price-
fixing). 
 248. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust 
Healthcare Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 605, 606–07 (1989) (approaching the topic of market 
failures with a focus on the health care industry).  
 249. 373 U.S. 341, 356–67 (1963). 
 250. Cf. id. at 361–67 (holding that a self-regulatory body’s failure to hold a hearing before 
terminating a member’s privileges violated the Sherman Act). 
 251. At least one lower court has arguably addressed this issue; the membership of the alleged 
cartel in Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass’ns, 819 F.2d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 1987), which could be seen as 
a feature of its decision-making process, proved important to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in that 
case.  
 252. Brodley, supra note 54, at 1042. 
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rivalry.253 But again, there is insufficient debate about how long is too 
long, or how to trade off different kinds of rivalry. 
B. Incommensurability and Institutional Design 
Fully recognizing the commensurability problem in antitrust 
suggests that the current allocation of decisionmaking—which relies 
heavily on courts—is not optimal. I do not set out in this section to make 
a precise recommendation of how power would optimally be allocated; 
rather, I intend to outline the terms of the institutional design debate 
that—largely because of the commensurability myth—has so far 
remained underdeveloped, and to suggest ways in which the 
commensurability problem should influence this debate. 
1. The Case for Agency Decisionmaking:  
Expertise and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
As I have argued in previous work, the current dominance of 
judicial decisionmaking in antitrust law and policy is inefficient,254 and 
the commensurability problem may be another reason to be critical of 
courts as antitrust regulators. In these articles I argue that courts, 
lacking access to high-level expertise and the power to study economic 
phenomena in a systematic way, are ill-equipped to serve as the 
primary rule makers in an area of law now dominated by questions of 
economic science. Agencies on the other hand, especially the Federal 
Trade Commission, do have such expertise and ability to generate and 
analyze econometric data.255 And because agency regulation often 
involves making widely applicable rules, rather than individual 
holdings with potentially narrow application, the FTC could more 
efficiently and comprehensively provide guidance to firms who wish to 
avoid antitrust liability. 
 
 253. The Supreme Court’s vertical restraint jurisprudence provides some good examples. See, 
e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007) (finding that 
restrictions which foreclose one dimension of competition, such as intrabrand, yet promote another 
dimension, like interbrand, should be analyzed under the rule of reason rather than the per se 
approach); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (same, as applied to vertical maximum 
price fixing); Cont’l TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977) (same, as applied to 
vertical territorial restraints). 
 254. Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2011) [hereinafter Haw, Amicus Briefs]; Rebecca Haw, Delay and Its Benefits 
for Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, 55 B. C. L. REV. 331 (2014) [hereinafter 
Haw, Delay]. 
 255.  Haw, Amicus Briefs, supra note 254, at 1262–63. 
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For the same reasons, using an agency like the FTC for antitrust 
law making and adjudication may have significant advantages over 
courts when it comes to addressing the commensurability problem. To 
a large extent, the problem is one of quantification; as discussed in Part 
II.A.1, incommensurability in antitrust cases often arises from lack of 
data about how consumers behave when offered better quality products 
or more variety. In contrast to a court, an agency like the FTC has the 
ability to gather, or even require disclosure of, data from various 
industries.256 And when clear data about consumer preferences is 
unavailable, an agency like the FTC can use its staff of economists to 
develop ingenious ways—such as by analogy to other industries—of 
making quantitative estimates of qualitative consumer benefits. 
The fact that the incommensurability problem derives in large 
part from quantification problems, and the fact that some of these 
problems may be overcome by econometric analysis, suggests yet 
another reason why increased agency decisionmaking may be optimal 
for antitrust. Cost-benefit analysis, a frequently-used technique in 
agency rulemaking, may deliver significant payoffs for antitrust law. 
Although it is not unusual to casually refer to Rule of Reason analysis 
as being analogous to cost-benefit analysis,257 there seems to be little 
appetite for applying to antitrust the kind of empirically rigorous CBA 
required for many agency rules and regulations. As a practical matter, 
this lack of interest in CBA makes sense; the Sherman Act does not call 
for it, and agencies like the FTC almost never engage in rulemaking 
that might trigger the need for CBA. But as a matter of theory, it is far 
from clear that CBA would be an inappropriate method for trading off 
the otherwise incommensurate values in competition regulation. 
I am not prepared to argue here the full-throated case for CBA 
in antitrust, but I believe the commensurability myth has suppressed 
important debates about its merits in the antitrust context. CBA is 
perhaps most appropriate when the costs and benefits of regulation are 
relatively quantifiable, and when some consensus exists on the social 
values sought by regulation, as is perhaps true in antitrust.258 
Although, as I explore in Part II, not all costs and benefits of a given 
 
 256.  Id. at 1259. 
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regulation are perfectly quantifiable, they are probably no harder to 
quantify than in other areas of regulation where CBA is the norm, such 
as in environmental and workplace law. And although the social values 
vindicated by antitrust are somewhat varied, giving rise to questions 
such as whether any weight should be given to future benefits from 
innovation, or whether it is acceptable to benefit one kind of consumer 
at the expense of another, those values—economic efficiency, 
competition, and consumer welfare—occupy a relatively narrow 
bandwidth when compared to other areas where CBA is used 
extensively. More needs to be said about whether CBA offers a fruitful 
way to address the commensurability problem in antitrust, as it has in 
other areas of law. 
2. The Case for Legislative Guidance:  
Balancing Competing Social Values 
The tradeoffs required by antitrust regulation may be more 
circumscribed than in many areas of law, but because the quantification 
problem is only partly to blame for antitrust’s incommensurability, and 
because the quantitative problem cannot always be satisfactorily 
solved, antitrust law will likely always require important compromises 
between competing values. The indeterminacy of economics on 
questions from how to measure quality to how to trade off interpersonal 
welfare259 is perhaps illustrated by the divergence between American 
antitrust and EU competition law. Both regimes prize economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare, both use the expertise of economists, 
and yet they often diverge in rule and rule application.260 This 
divergence suggests that value judgments—tasks typically associated 
with legislative decisionmaking261—are required to regulate 
competition. 
When Justice Scalia said that choosing between state and 
national interests in Dormant Commerce Clause cases was less like 
balancing and “more like judging whether a particular line is longer 
than a particular rock is heavy,” his solution was “to leave [the] 
 
 259. See Craswell, supra note 15, at 1448–50 (explaining that welfare economics “does not 
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if some individuals would gain while others lose”); Hammer & Sage, supra note 222, at 612 
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 261. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 20, at 839 (arguing that “[t]he choice of ultimate values, 
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essentially legislative judgments to the Congress.”262 Although he did 
not explain why he considered the decision “legislative” or why it was 
best reserved to the Congress, his reasoning is easily supplied. When 
regulation requires different social values to be traded off, the most 
appropriate decisionmaker is the one most democratically accountable. 
In theory, the different social values at stake will be represented in an 
elected body of government, lending democratic legitimacy to whatever 
compromise follows. 
Because at least some of the commensurability problem is 
unavoidable—especially the problem of choosing between different 
consumer groups—legislative decisionmaking may be the most 
legitimate means of making some antitrust rules. Antitrust does not 
implicate the same diversity of interests present in other areas of 
regulation, nor even the diversity of interests that it once vindicated, as 
when antitrust was seen as a tool to protect small businesses or 
encourage the decentralization of the economy and political power.263 
But the commensurability problem does present choices among 
competing interests that would suggest that at least some antitrust 
decisionmaking qualifies under Justice Scalia’s paradigm as 
“legislative.” 
The trouble with making the argument that more antitrust law 
should be done legislatively is that the Congress already has broad 
powers to regulate competition that it has chosen not to use. The 
Sherman Act was of course an act of legislation, but its text was so broad 
as to leave wide discretion to courts and agencies in its 
implementation.264 And there has been relatively little legislative 
activity in antitrust since. This inactivity would suggest that there are 
significant barriers to creating antitrust legislation. 
One such barrier could be simple legislative inertia; antitrust 
has ceased to be the hot button political issue it once was, and so has 
been placed on the legislative back burner. In a world where passing 
even highly salient legislation is nearly impossible, back-burner status 
means almost total paralysis. Another reason why Congress may have 
preferred to leave antitrust law making to courts is that the world of 
antitrust is dynamic—both economic science and the structure and 
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practices of industry change rapidly.265 In an environment of moving 
targets, the common law, with its ability to evolve, may be a more 
efficient way to regulate than by static statutory language.266 Whatever 
its cause, the reality of legislative inactivity must be considered before 
offering Congressional involvement as a cure-all for the 
commensurability problem in antitrust. 
3. The Case for Courts: Judgment, Not Calculation 
Having made the case for some increased involvement by expert 
agencies and for more legislative activity, while acknowledging that 
expecting too much of Congress is unrealistic, I turn to the role of courts 
in addressing the commensurability problem in antitrust law. Despite 
the common conception that courts are ill-suited to make law, and the 
perhaps less common conception that they do not make law, courts do 
have some advantages over legislative branches in regulating activity. 
Even given the commensurability problems that courts confront, it is 
worth exploring whether the judiciary’s advantages over Congress 
justify leaving it some norm-creation role. Further, although there are 
good arguments for an increased role for agencies in antitrust 
adjudication and rulemaking, the commensurability problem militates 
against a total technocratic shift for antitrust. 
When it comes to creating rules about how to trade off 
incommensurate competitive values, Congress may have the advantage 
of democratic legitimacy, but it also has the disadvantage of exercising 
only discretionary power. This discretion leads to the back-burner and 
inertia problems discussed above, while courts must, by virtue of 
deciding individual disputes, create antitrust law at a relatively steady 
pace.267 Similarly, because courts are asked to respond to evolving 
commercial practices and to apply the best economic science available 
in the moment, they are arguably more able to respond to social and 
scientific change relevant to regulation. To the extent the 
commensurability problem changes shape over time—and there is 
reason to believe that it does—courts may be better positioned to make 
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the kinds of rules and compromises called for by incommensurability in 
antitrust. 
Finally, Justice Scalia’s claim that all value-laden choices should 
be made by a legislature and not the judiciary seems exaggerated.268 
Inherent in the very idea of judging is the notion of judgment; courts 
are frequently delegated regulatory and adjudicative tasks that must 
choose between valid and important social values. Judges may be more 
insulated from and unresponsive to public opinion than the 
legislature,269 but courts are often asked, especially in the constitutional 
arena, to make tough calls between competing values. Their insulation 
from public opinion could actually be a comparative advantage, one that 
gives the judiciary “the [fundamental] freedom and responsibility to 
decide [cases] on broad social considerations.”270 
As I have argued elsewhere, more antitrust authority should be 
delegated to agencies, and the commensurability problem mostly 
underscores this point. But because some incommensurability is 
inherent—that is, it is not just a problem of quantification—the 
technocratic nature of antitrust should not be exaggerated. A total shift 
of adjudicative and rule-making power to agencies may be a bridge too 
far when antitrust is an exercise in judgment, not just calculation. The 
reality of antitrust regulation is that it is—and must be—a 
collaboration between those trained in the scientific practice of 
measuring harms and benefits of a competitive practice and those 
qualified to apply value judgments in the close calls.271 
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CONCLUSION 
Antitrust’s focus on economic and competitive effects has 
probably made the law more rational, predictable, and efficient, but it 
has not made it free from value judgments. Although antitrust courts 
routinely describe their task in § 1 cases as measuring the “net 
competitive effect” of a restraint on trade, competitive effects argued on 
either side are typically different in kind, and so cannot be reduced to a 
“net” effect. Pro- and anticompetitive effects of agreements among 
competitors, as they are presented to courts, are usually 
incommensurate and balancing them under the Rule of Reason requires 
value judgments that often economic science cannot supply. 
The commensurability myth, here illustrated by Rule of Reason 
cases, pervades all areas of antitrust law where courts must trade off 
pro- and anticompetitive effects. The myth has led courts to undertake 
numerous avoidance moves in § 1 litigation that make antitrust less 
predictable and less fair. It has prevented important academic and 
judicial debates from reaching maturity: more should be said and 
written about how to trade off the qualitative dimensions of consumer 
welfare for quantitative ones, and about when market failures justify a 
departure from rivalrous competition. And more needs to be said about 
how the commensurability problem should influence the institutional 
design of antitrust law and enforcement. This Article, by identifying the 
myth and some of its consequences, takes the first step in developing a 
healthy discourse about what kinds of competition are most important. 
It is time to let go of the view that antitrust is exceptional. Despite our 
modern economic-driven conception of it, antitrust law is not just a 
maximization problem, but also an exercise in judgment. 
 
 
 
